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Southeast Asia Report

No. 1319

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SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

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VIETNAM

VICTORIA ALP WARNING ON FOREIGN POLICY

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 20 Jun 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by Paul Ellercamp]

[Text]

THE Victorian ALP delivered stern rebukes to the Federal Government at the weekend over its foreign policy, condemning some of the Government's actions, expressing outrage and reaffirming policies on East Timor, aid to Vietnam, and uranium.

The Victorian ALP president, Mr Ray Hogan, warned on the possibility of "dramatic splits" in the party if the Government made changes in policy without party approval.

But the party avoided a public brawl when the centre-Right, which supports the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, offered no opposition to the moves sponsored by the socialist Left.

The attacks on the Government were stinging in their language, but avoided personal reference to the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke.

It was a warning that the branch would not tolerate what it regarded as serious breaches of party policies.

But the criticism, at the annual State conference of the party, is not expected to force changes in the short term.

The Victorian ALP cannot direct action to be taken by the Federal Government, and Mr Hawke so far has had the support of most of the Caucus.

The failure of the party's centre Unity faction to publicly oppose the socialist-Left's actions reflected the fact that Mr Hawke's supporters would inevitably have been beaten in a vote.

Centre Unity could not place itself in a position of virtually opposing party policies which the socialist-Left sought to reaffirm. Neither was there any point in a public brawl when the outcome was predetermined.

There may also have been concern that the group should not be seen automatically as Mr Hawke's defenders, especially when no federal minister involved in the issues was attending the party conference to defend them.

The centre-Right may also be concerned not to antagonise its opponents in the party as overtures are being made privately to get several large right-wing unions to re-affiliate with the Victorian ALP.

The treatment of the policy disputes at the Victorian conference was in marked contrast with the NSW Labor Party conference a week ago, when the Right, which dominates the party in that State, inserted in resolutions an allowance that the Government could implement policy virtually at its discretion.

The Victorian branch passed three main resolutions focusing the Left's attack on the Government's policies.

On East Timor, the conference called on the Government to publicly affirm full support for self-determination in East Timor; withdraw Australian recognition of Indonesia's takeover of East Timor; cease military aid to Indonesia; and take immediate diplomatic steps to have the matter placed on the agenda of this year's United Nations General Assembly.

The conference also requested Victorian MPs to sponsor

a resolution through Caucus supporting the branch.

The resolution's language was angry. It condemned the continuation of Australian military aid to Indonesia, accused the Hawke Government of supporting Indonesia's occupation, and expressed "strong dissatisfaction" with the Government's handling of the issue.

The resolution dismissed the forthcoming visit by a Parliamentary delegation to East Timor as incapable of forming the basis for a change in party policy, as Mr Hawke had suggested it could.

Different

The resolution's sponsor, Ms Jean McLean, told the conference that many people were "incensed" by Mr Hawke's policy shift towards acceptance of the takeover.

"We categorically deny that so-called experts in the Foreign Affairs Department have superior wisdom to members of this party," she said.

"What they do have is different politics."

The conference re-affirmed party policy of resuming aid to Vietnam, despite the Government's decision to delay the resumption until diplomatic moves have been made to resolve the Indo-Chinese problem politically.

But the conference's harshest language came in the uranium policy re-affirmation, which accused the Government of "hypocrisy" and "irresponsible actions" in granting permission to two uranium companies to negotiate new export contracts.

"The Federal Government has chosen to repudiate even the present watered-down version of our national uranium policy," a report of the party's Anti-Uranium Committee said.

It added: "This committee is outraged by the Federal Government's total disregard of rank-and-file views."

The committee chairman, Ms Joan Coxsedge, an MLC, said the party stated in its rules "that we expect Labor politicians to carry out party policy and not to carry on as if they were a bunch of independents".

The Left was strident in its criticism of the Government without naming Mr Hawke.

It was illustrated by the outgoing ALP branch president, Mr Ray Hogan, who lectured the Government on its treatment of party policy, and urged delegates to "call a spade a spade" in criticising the Government if necessary.

CSO: 4200/710

LEFTISTS ANGERED BY INDONESIAN POLICY

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 6 Jun 83 pp 1, 2

[Text] ALL sections of the ALP would be "angered" by any change to the party's attitude on East Timor, a prominent member of Labor's left wing, Mr Ken Fry, said yesterday.

Mr Fry said the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, had "sacrificed principle for expediency."

● The Deputy Leader of the Australian Democrats, Senator Colin Mason, said Mr Hawke would live to regret bitterly his approval of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor which, he said, must increase Indonesion pressure on Papua New Guinea.

● A Foreign Affairs spokesman conceded that Mr Hawke had softened Australia's stand over East Timor.

● The Queensland branch of the ALP will seek a briefing from Mr Hawke when he returns. The State council on Saturday voted to support the National Labor Conference policy on East Timor and an official said later he was "surprised" at Mr Hawke's statement.

● The President of the Australia-East Timor Association, Dr George Preston, accused the Government of "betraying" the people of East Timor.

Mr Fry, in an interview on Capital Seven Canberra, said Mr Hawke had broken an undertaking to Caucus.

He had asked Mr Hawke in Caucus not to make any major foreign affairs announcements without consulting the Caucus.

"It will not only anger the left wing of the party but also the grass roots of the party," he said. He knew of no ALP branches which supported Mr Hawke's stand.

A Foreign Affairs spokesman, while saying Australia's stand on East Timor had been softened, said Mr Hawke had moved only "by a centimetre" from the views expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden.

The spokesman told *The Australian*: "Mr Hayden has stuck to the line that Australia expressed deep regret that an internationally recognised act of self determination did not take place in East Timor; he's never gone further than that. Mr Hawke has gone a centimetre further."

He claimed reports that Mr Hawke's statements were a significant shift away from ALP policy were "exaggerations".

But Senator Mason said: "Indonesia has no cultural, historic or ethnic claim on East Timor, and the takeover has been an act of conquest in which more than 100,000 Timorese people have died.

"Indonesian interest in Papua New Guinea can now be expected to increase."

Senator Mason said that during Indonesia's independence struggle her territorial claims were based on the 14th-century empire of Majapahit, which included East Timor and Papua New Guinea. The Indonesians claimed the empire also included parts of Northern Australia.

Dr Preston said in Melbourne that nothing had changed in East Timor and ALP policies were still relevant.

Support

"The only circumstance that has changed is that Mr Hawke is now Prime Minister."

"Labor policy is still relevant in every respect. The circumstances in East Timor remain unchanged. The war continues, and the people continue to bitterly reject the Indonesian presence," he said.

The Queensland ALP State Council, when voting to support the national labor conference policy on East Timor, said it recognised "the timing, rate and extent of its implementation was a matter for the Government in the light of prevailing conditions".

The council discussed the policy before it was aware of Mr Hawke's statement that the occupation of East Timor was "in the past" and that Australia should not vacillate or be devious on the issue.

The State secretary, Mr Peter Beattie, said Mr Hawke's statement had come as a surprise. But the branch did not want to come into open conflict with Mr Hawke over it.

"It is at odds with the decision we made yesterday. But not greatly, he is looking at prevailing conditions," he said.

CSO: 4200/710

LABOR TO REVAMP PARTY STRUCTURE

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 7 Jun 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by Ian Perkin]

[Text]

THE national executive of the Australian Labor Party is to undertake a major restructuring of its federal secretariat so its operations better suit the new demands of being in office.

Labor's national secretary, Mr Bob McMullan, confirmed in Canberra last night that he was reviewing the whole executive structure of the party.

He said he would present a report to the national executive meeting on June 29 outlining the options.

As part of the reorganisation, the ALP's assistant national secretary, Mr Ken Bennett, will resign and take several weeks leave before starting another job, probably one involved with the party.

It is understood Mr Bennett will join the staff of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, Mr Lionel Bowen, but this could not be confirmed last night.

The reorganisation of the executive level of the party is the first undertaken since 1975, when the national secretary/assistant national secretary structure was created.

It is possible this will be retained in a modified form if the national executive still considers it will work well enough for a party in government.

Resignations

But a "strong option" Mr McMullan will present in his report is to establish four party "organisers" directly under the existing national secretary.

He said last night he had not started to compile his report for the June 29 meeting, but that the "organiser" structure was one of the most attractive options being considered.

Each "organiser" would be responsible for a specific aspect of the work of the ALP executive and presumably would report directly to the national secretary.

In undertaking the review of the executive structure, Mr McMullan said the party was taking advantage of the recent resignation of several prominent members of the ALP hierarchy.

They include the ALP's former chief press officer, Mr Geoff Walsh — now with the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke — and the assistant federal secretary, Mr Bennett.

Referring to the proposed "organiser" structure, Mr McMullan said the party was "not as far down the track" as making a decision.

"But it is under discussion and it is an option that is being very seriously considered," he added.

While confirming that Mr Bennett would be leaving the secretariat and taking some leave, Mr McMullan said he could not confirm whether the Senator Gordon McIntosh (WA), released a petition signed by Mr Hawke last November and expressing support for the United Nations in its moves to uphold the rights of the East Timorese to self-determination.

THE left wing of the NSW ALP began preparing for a

major attack on Mr Hawke at the branch conference this weekend, although right-wing party officers believe they will defeat it.

VICTORIAN ALP members also warned of a "showdown" at their conference on Saturday week, and the party secretary, Mr Peter Bachelor, warned the party would become demoralised if its decisions were ignored.

SOUTH Australian ALP members will debate 10 agenda items calling on the Federal Government to support self-determination for East Timor at their State Convention this weekend.

THE Timorese Association of Victoria, usually an apolitical refugee group, condemned Mr Hawke for ignoring ALP policy.

The issue is emerging within the party's branches now as one largely of passion and rhetoric, since the branches themselves can't force Mr Hawke to change his policy.

But the issue will still cause the Government considerable embarrassment as it is fought out, especially if it remains unresolved when Caucus meets again next month.

It will also throw up substantial fodder for Opposition attacks, following on the series of problems the Government faced during the parliamentary session just ended.

Apart from continuing defence aid to Indonesia, Mr Hawke also said in Jakarta that the platform and resolutions of the party reflected the situation at the time they were adopted, and did not take into account changed circumstances.

Mr Hawke also hoped in Jakarta that the parliamentary delegation due to visit East Timor next month would help to swing the argument within the ALP in favor of recognising the Indonesian takeover.

But a member of the delegation, Senator McIntosh, made it clear yesterday that this was highly unlikely.

"If Mr Hawke thinks we will bring back a report from East Timor supporting Indonesia, he can forget it," he said.

His fellow delegates are Labor MPs Mr Bill Morrison (NSW) and Mr Manfred Cross (Qld), and NSW Liberal Mr Don Dobie. Senator David MacGibbon (Lib, Qld) is also expected to join the delegation.

Senator McIntosh, a vocal critic of Indonesia's role in East Timor and the chairman of the Senate select committee on human rights in East Timor, said the Government had lost international credibility because of Mr Hawke's "apparent about-face".

"Do we sweep 200,000 bodies under the carpet and accept Indonesia's idea that we continue this de jure recognition of their occupation?" he said.

In Victoria, the party's rank and file will insist at their State Conference next Saturday week that standing policy be upheld.

"As far as we are concerned it is still current policy until we hear differently from Mr Hawke," the party secretary, Mr Batchelor, said.

CSO: 4200/710

LABOR LEADER CALLS FOR MORE LEFTISTS IN CABINET

Melbourne THE AGE in English 20 Jun 83 p 1

[Article by Bill Birnbauer]

[Excerpt]

Mr George Crawford, the controversial Socialist Left leader of the early 1970s, yesterday began a new term as Victorian Labor president with a call for more Left-wing representation in State Cabinet.

"I think there is some imbalance there, there is no question about that," he said. "I don't think the Left is adequately represented in State Cabinet or Federal Cabinet for that matter."

Mr Crawford, in his mid-50s and a prominent and outspoken member of the Socialist Left faction was elected as president of the ALP on Saturday. Mr Crawford beat the Centre Unity candidate, the State secretary of the Transport Workers Union, Mr Jim Davis, by 41 votes.

Mr Crawford's election is regarded by some as the beginning of a deterioration in the relationship between the organisation of the Labor Party and the Parliamentary party.

CSO: 4200/710

HAWKE ASSERTS LEADERSHIP

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 20 Jun 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by Russell Schneider]

[Text]

THE Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, yesterday bluntly refuted criticism of him from within the ALP by insisting that the Federal Government had to adjust to changing circumstances.

Mr Hawke made it clear he was the leader and he had no intention of abrogating the duties of leadership.

Responding to attacks on the alleged departure from party policy during his overseas trip, Mr Hawke said it would be the "height of irresponsibility" if the Government did not act in the light of the latest information.

"That would be a total abrogation of leadership," he said.

"I don't intend to pursue that course."

The Government came under severe attack from the Left at the Victorian ALP's annual State conference at the weekend.

But it was defended by the Victorian Premier, Mr Cain, who said that criticism would damage the Hawke Government, and that ALP members should accept the necessary discipline. (See story Page 2).

Mr Hawke denied that he had breached policy and rejected criticism of the Government's tough economic line by saying big spending might give ALP members a "sense of euphoria" without achieving worthwhile social goals.

He warned that big spending in the present economic circumstances could create "economic conditions of disaster" of spiralling interest rates, burgeoning inflation and rapid expanding unemployment.

Mr Hawke's response came after the Victorian ALP conference had passed a number of motions criticising government moves on Timor, uranium and the economy.

Mr Hawke's blunt statement on the economy sets the scene for clashes not only with the party organisation, but with the four State Labor premiers, who are already discussing ways of getting more funds from the Federal Government.

Mr Hawke refused to outline his approach to the premiers' conference, due to be held in less than a fortnight.

But his earlier remarks about the need for international economic restraint indicate that the talks between Mr Hawke and the State Labor leaders are likely to be rough.

Editorial — Page 6
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Mr Hawke was clearly happy with the results of his three week trip, which saw him holding top-level discussions in Indonesia, Paris, Washington and New York.

But the Victorian conference decisions made it clear that the Victorian branch of the party is unhappy with Mr Hawke's overseas statements.

At the weekend the conference:

CALLED on the Government to refuse to recognise Indonesia's takeover of East Timor.

DEMANDED that the Government implement its prices-incomes accord with unions, and speakers called for it to introduce expansionary economic measures.

INSISTED the Government stand by its uranium policy and cancel all uranium export licences, especially for supplies to France.

Mr Hawke said he had not departed from policy, and claimed his attitude to Timor and uranium had been misunderstood or misinterpreted.

He said his remarks on Timor were the same as those of the Foreign Minister, Mr Hayden, and pointed out that the Government had suspended early deliveries of uranium to France in the hope this would cause it to cease nuclear testing before the contractual delivery requirement in October next year.

Referring to Timor, Mr Hawke said the Government had to consider its policy of withholding defence aid to Indonesia until it withdrew troops from Timor "in relation to circumstances as they stand now".

Asked if he was concerned about "agitation" within the party, Mr Hawke said: "It seems to me to be healthy in a party like ours that there be discussion about issues.

"I don't accept because there is agitation, that the parliamentary leadership says therefore we cease to express a view ourselves, particularly on the basis of detailed information which is available to us more extensively than it is to the whole of the party.

"The height of irresponsibility of parliamentary leadership would be when it (the leadership) has information which it knows is relevant to the interests of the country, to refrain from expressing positions in the light of that knowledge.

"You live in such a changing world that governments have to adjust to some extent to those changing circumstances — without abandoning basic Labor Party philosophy.

"We now live in the 1980s — there has never been a more rapidly changing period of human history.

"A responsible Labor government must, within the framework of the philosophy of the party, take account of those changes."

Mr Hawke was careful to stress he was not making accusations against his critics, and said he could not respond directly to the Victorian conference decisions because he had not seen the detail of them.

But his remarks are likely to add to demands by the Left for a greater say in government decision-making.

CSO: 4200/710

VICTORIA ALP LEFT LOSES BID FOR CONTROL

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 20 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by Paul Lynch]

[Text]

THE socialist-Left faction of the Victorian ALP has strengthened its position but failed to gain effective control of the party's important administrative committee.

The Left came within one position of winning majority control on the influential 33-member committee in elections of senior branch office bearers at the State ALP conference in Melbourne at the weekend.

Voting by delegates at the conference saw the Left increase its numbers, holding powerful positions within the State party hierarchy, notably through the election of Left hard-liner, Mr George Crawford, as the new State ALP president.

But the status quo between the faction and the pro-Hawke Labor Unity faction on the administrative committee was maintained despite the loss of three positions by the Independents.

Before yesterday's ballot, the Independents held the balance of power on the administrative committee with six members, while the Left held 13 positions and the centrist Labor Unity 14 positions.

The election for the committee at yesterday's conference increased the strength of the Left, giving them 16 members while Labor Unity maintained its 14, with three Independents.

The shift to the Left by the rank-and-file of the Victorian ALP mirrors a similar shift away from the moderate faction two weeks ago when its dominance on the State Trades Hall Council was decimated.

The Left now holds nine of the 19 positions on the Victorian Trades Hall Council compared with the previous situation when the moderates held 15 of the 18 council positions. (A new position was created at the last THC election.)

The State ALP conference elections at the weekend also saw two long-time rivals of the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, returned to senior party positions.

The new Victorian ALP president, Mr Crawford, was overwhelmingly endorsed to succeed the socialist-Left president of the past two years, Mr Ray Hogan.

Mr Crawford, 56, won the presidency for the third time, having held the position in 1969-70 before the Federal ALP intervened in the Victorian party's affairs, and again eight months after the intervention in 1971.

Another hardline left-winger and former Victorian ALP secretary, Mr Bill Hartley, was elected to the administrative committee which runs the party business between conferences, but is also influential in formulating both State and Federal party policy.

The return of Mr Hartley, a pro-Arab activist, is a gloomy prospect for the moderates within the party and supporters of the Premier, Mr Cain.

Mr Hartley savagely criticised Mr Hawke last week over the explosive East Timor question.

The trade union movement also strengthened its position within the party hierarchy at the weekend with the election of ACTU secretary, Mr Bill Kelty, and the re-election of its junior vice-president, Mr Simon Crean, to the administrative committee.

CSO: 4200/710

LABOR MOVES TO BAN RIGHT-WING UNION

Melbourne THE AGE in English 3 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Damien Kingsburg and David Humphries]

[Text]

The Labor Party in Victoria tonight will move to ban a Right-wing union organisation that some party members claim is trying to infiltrate the ALP.

The organisation, the Industrial Action Fund, is a breakaway from Mr B. A. Santamaria's National Civic Council. It claims to control unions with a combined membership of about 100,000.

The Anti-National Civic Council sub-committee of the ALP's State administrative committee, the controlling body between State conferences, will move tonight to have the fund proscribed.

If, as expected, the administrative committee adopts the resolution, it will be passed on to the ALP's State conference on 18 June.

It is for that body to decide whether members of the Industrial Action Fund will be banned from ALP membership in Victoria. A national ban would require a vote by Federal Conference.

A decision to proscribe the Industrial Action Fund would amount to a direction to party members not to belong to the fund. If they were found to have dual membership, they would face expulsion from the ALP.

The ALP's Centre Unity faction wants four unions — the Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Union, the Federated Clerks' Union, the Federated Iron Workers' Union and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners — to affiliate with the ALP.

The four unions are believed to support the fund.

This would shift the power away from the Socialist Left and the group of Independents that supported Mr Cain's bid for parliamentary leadership.

Such a shift would give control of the Victorian ALP to the Centre Unity faction.

Necessarily

A prominent member of the Centre Unity faction and the Federal secretary of the Storemen and Packers' Union, Mr Simon Crean, said last night he had no difficulty with helping to proscribe any orga: ization with outside links detrimental to the Labor Party.

Mr Crean, who is also a vice-president of the ACTU, said the proscribing of the Industrial Action Front would not necessarily result in any impediments to the four unions affiliating with the ALP.

"Some of their officials might be members of the fund, but then I would expect some of them are Labor members," he said.

The man at the centre of the move to ban the Industrial Action Fund is Mr Michael O'Grady, a former assistant Federal secretary of the Storemen and Packers' Union, who resigned last year to join the State Government's industrial taskforce. Mr O'Grady is again contesting his former union post.

He is convener of the anti-NCC sub-committee, and says he is confident his motion tonight will be adopted.

"This is a clandestine organisation and like the NCC it will be difficult to establish just who is a member, but I know some of the members have already joined the ALP," Mr O'Grady said last night.

"They (the fund) have already declared they will take a more flexible attitude to associations with the ALP than the National Civic Council did in the past."

Mr O'Grady said he had resigned from the executive of the Centre Unity faction in early 1981, when he said the faction made it clear it wanted to admit to the ALP unions with NCC associations.

He said he had the unanimous support of the anti-NCC subcommittee and a clear majority on the administrative committee.

Should the Industrial Action Fund be proscribed, it will join the National Civic Council, the National Union of Railwaymen and the Protestant Defence League on the ALP list.

The leaders of the Industrial Action Fund were on the NCC's industrial committee until their resignations last August. They claim to have taken nine of the 12 NCC industrial officers and 200 full-time union officers with them.

They formed themselves into the Industrial Action Fund last week and have approached traditional NCC supporters for funding.

Mr Santamaria, the leader of the NCC, said yesterday that it had been common knowledge for three years that Mr Crean and the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, had been actively seeking the re-affiliation of the right wing unions.

"What the Centre Unity would be interested in is the number of delegates from these unions to party conferences," Mr Santamaria said.

He said he would not disagree with the suggestion that the split in the NCC was to make the righ wing unions, and their officials, more acceptable to the ALP.

But the split, he said, was for more profound reasons. The NCC had been increasingly shifting its emphasis away from union activities, Mr Santamaria said.

A spokesman for the Industrial Action Fund in Victoria, Mr Gerald, Mercer, yesterday said the affiliation of the four unions "has the support of Mr Hawke, and will probably take place in time."

Mr Mercer said the attitude of the unions associated with the fund would be flexible towards the ALP's requirements.

"We'd judge the participants on their merits," he said, "as it is the most delicate of matters."

Mr Mercer said he saw the affiliation of the unions associated with the fund as being "the natural trend" but he said that it was not definite at this stage.

The Minister for Transport and prominent Centre Unity faction figure, Mr Steve Crabb, last night said that if the unions did affiliate with the ALP it would affect the decisions of the party conference and would generally "influence the affairs of the party".

However, he said, it would be premature to say what that influence might be.

Mr Crabb said the move against the four unions tonight might succeed, but that "it is pretty hard for the party to keep out any group that wants to join in the long term".

CSO: 4200/710

ECONOMY HITS EIGHT-YEAR LOW

Melbourne THE AGE in English 3 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Russell Barton]

[Text]

CANBERRA. — The economy went rapidly backwards in the December and March quarters, to record its worst performance since 1975.

National accounts figures released by the Bureau of Statistics yesterday showed the severity of the recession. The March quarter saw a 0.8 per cent contraction of real gross non-farm product — the measure of the industrial sector of the economy — after a 0.7 per cent drop in the December quarter.

The only two consecutive quarters of similar falls in recent years were the September and December periods of 1975 when non-farm product dropped by 0.9 per cent and 0.4 per cent respectively.

In the three months to March 1983 all measures of the economy were in reverse. Farm product fell 1.2 per cent before the breaking of the drought and overall gross domestic product shrunk by 0.8 per cent.

The Treasurer, Mr Keating, used the figures to berate the former Government. They portrayed starkly the dismal economic position the Government had inherited, he said.

He said that total GDP was 2.2 per cent lower at the end of March than a year earlier.

"During each of its last three quarters and in five out of its last six quarters in office the Fraser Government presided over an economy locked firmly into reverse," he said.

"It is an unenviable record, which demonstrates the magnitude of the task ahead of the Government."

Mr Keating said the disparity between the trends in private sector and public sector investment spending which was evident in 1982 was more pronounced in the March quarter.

Over the year to March, private fixed-capital spending fell by 17 per cent, compared with a 9 per cent increase in public investment spending. At the same time the share of GDP held by companies' profits fell from 13.3 per cent to 11.8 per cent.

Mr Keating said the Government's efforts had been devoted to halting the slide and turning the economy around during next financial year.

The only components of GDP which showed real increases (after taking inflation into account) in the March period were consumption spending, both private (up 0.9 per cent) and Government (up 3.7 per cent).

This was despite a further rise in the household savings ratio — a further reflection of recession — to 13.4 per cent. A year earlier the savings ratio was 11.7 per cent.

One favorable sign for the future evident in yesterday's figures was the 0.7 per cent reduction in stocks of goods held by companies, after a 1.3 per cent cut in the December quarter.

While this rundown of stocks contributed to the fall in GDP, it is now reaching the point where companies must again step up production to replenish stocks. Recent production figures issued by the bureau indicated that the turnaround was beginning in a number of industries.

Another pleasing indicator was the slowdown in inflation in the March quarter, as measured by the implicit price deflector covering spending on GDP. This rose just 0.4 per cent in the three months, against a 3.2 per cent rise in the December period. The annual inflation figure under this measurement, however remains in double figures at 10.3 per cent.

CSO: 4200/710

NEW GIPPSLAND OILFIELD

Melbourne THE AGE in English 17 Jun 83 p 25

[Article by Jim Brumby]

[Text]

Wire-line logs run on Esso-BHP's Luderick 1 well in the Gippsland Basin are believed to have identified a 20 million barrel oil field.

In an announcement to stock exchanges, BHP said three cores were cut between 1837 and 1861.5 metres, with hydrocarbon indications from 1837 to 1856 metres.

The company said minor shows were also encountered while drilling below 1874 metres.

While a field of 20 million barrels is only about the size of Barracouta when first discovered, at new oil prices it is worth about $700 million. Kingfish, the largest Bass Strait field, had initial reserves of about 1240 million barrels.

It is believed the log analysis in conjunction with geological information has suggested a field of about 20 million barrels, which would make it the most prospective since Esso-BHP began its revitalised exploration effort two years ago.

The well is close to the Bream oil and gas field, which enhances its prospectivity, and places it above the finds closer to the Gippsland coast at Whiting, Seahorse and Wirrah.

As new oil, Luderick will give a needed boost to the profitability of any development at Bream, which is old oil.

Esso-BHP believes that without new oil, the economics of Bream are very marginal.

The operator for the consortium, Shell Australia, said a test recovered 46 standard cubic feet of gas, 9 litres of oil and 10 litres of mud filtrate in a 22.7 litre container from the interval 3090 to 3097 metres.

Another test run over 3129 to 3132 metres recovered 2.23 standard cubic feet of gas, half a litre of oil and three litres of mud filtrate in a 3.8 litre container.

The results of the tests are now being evaluated. The well is in Vic P-19. Interest holders are: Shell, 40 per cent; News Corp and TNT Management Pty Ltd, 20 per cent each; Crusader, 15 per cent; and Mincorp Offshore Pty Ltd, 5 per cent.

CSO: 4200/710

PRIME MINISTER WARNS RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS

Connections With Communists

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 12 Jun 83 p 1

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Sat--Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad today reminded religious extremists, deviationists and would-be revolutionaries of the existence of the ISA.

In a warning to them, the prime minister said the act will be used against those who threaten the security and unity of the country.

"It is important to remember that we still have the ISA," he said.

"If certain people pose a threat to the country, we can arrest them."

He, however, said he could not foresee any arrests being made under the ISA in the "immediate future."

"What happens after that, I cannot say," he said.

Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir said some members of an Opposition party have become so extreme they consider themselves apart from other Muslims in the country.

"We can have opposition parties in the country but they should not go to the extreme of telling lies to destroy the unity of the people over things which are not political," he said.

To this party, nothing that the government is doing to help the people, the Malays in particular, is right or good, he added.

When the Amanah Saham Nasional scheme was launched to help Malays get their share of the corporate wealth in the country, he said, the party had criticised it.

"Yet, if we had not launched such a scheme, it will, instead, be criticising us and asking what the government, in particular Umno, has done for the Malays after 26 years in power," the prime minister said.

Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir told reporters after chairing the Umno Supreme Council meeting, that apart from taking such action as arresting those whose activities threaten the security of the nation, the government will just have to continue explaining its policies to the people.

He noted that some members of the party at the lower levels have been known to have connections with the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya (CPM).

They have also had meetings with the communists, who are aiming at this particular group of people for support.

The communists have also voiced their support for the so-called Muslim struggle.

Asked whether the government would arrest party members with such links, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir merely said there was no need to identify them at the moment.

Asked which group--the communists or extremist fundamentalists--posed the bigger threat to the nation's security, the prime minister said: "Both pose different threats."

He also differentiated between the harmless fundamentalists and the deviationists.

The fundamentalists are those who adhere to the teachings of the Quran; the deviationists are the ones who go to the extreme and move from the actual teachings into something quite different.

Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir also said there was a move among some members of the Opposition party to create a revolution in the country.

These would-be revolutionaries worked on the basis that the existing system was bad and hence should be replaced, he added.

Comment by Pas Leader

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 14 Jun 83 p 5

[Text]

PULAU PINANG, Mon.

The Government should provide the necessary opportunities to Pas to help the relevant authorities combat the communist threat, the party's national president, Haji Yusof Rawa said here today.

He said Pas was prepared to be actively involved in building up national resilience to uphold peace and sovereignty of the country.

"The party wished to offer its services in consolidating the people's consciousness in Islam and increasing their love for freedom and justice," he said.

Haji Yusof was commenting on the recent statement by the Prime Minister that some members of a political party in the country had been co-operating with the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya without the knowledge of the party's leadership.

He said in his policy speech at the Pas muktamar (general assembly) on April 29 in Kuala Lumpur, he had clearly voiced the party's commitment to Islam and in accordance with the Quran and "Sunnah".

He said the party rejected whatever form of man made ideology such as socialism, pragmatism or communism which were contrary to its Islamic struggle.

He said to-date no communist or subversive elements had managed to infiltrate the party.

CSO: 4200/562

FIVE UNIVERSITIES TO SWITCH TO BAHASA MALAYSIA

Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES in English 30 Jun 83 p 18

[Text] All five Malaysian universities will use Bahasa Malaysia as the sole medium of instruction for first-year courses when the new academic session starts next month.

The move represents a culmination of the programme to implement the national education policy which aims to replace English with Bahasa Malaysia as the sole medium of instruction in the Malaysian education system.

With the implementation of Bahasa Malaysia as the sole language of instruction for all first-year university students this year, those graduating from 1987 will have been fully schooled in the language.

This fulfils the desire of Malaysia's independence fighters and nationalists to see the national language emerging as the administrative, commercial and academic language.

The five universities are the national university, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, the agriculture university, Universiti Pertanian, the technological university, Universiti Teknoloji Malaysia, the science university, Universiti Sains Malaysia and the country's oldest university, Universiti Malaya.

The language shift, however, does not affect the recently set up International Islamic University (IIU).

Being an international educational institution, the IIU does not come under the Universities and University Colleges Act and is not compelled to make Bahasa Malaysia its sole language of instruction.

The first batch of 180 students of the IIU, who start classes next month, will have English as the primary language of instruction.

Education ministry officials said they did not expect any problem from the full use of Bahasa Malaysia at the higher educational level.

This was because the programme had been implemented gradually over the years, from primary school to pre-university level.

The five universities also appear to be fully prepared to implement the plan, which represents a milestone in the post-Merdeka national education system.

This shift towards the full use of Bahasa Malaysia in the education system started in stages since the Education Act, 1961, was enacted as the basis of the national education policy.--Bernama.

CSO: 4200/692

TJIBAOU MEETS WITH AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 9 Jun 83 p 6

[Article by Piers Akerman]

[Text]

THE Foreign Minister, Mr Hayden, and the Minister for Aviation, Mr Beazley, have undertaken a subtle exercise in international diplomacy which has the potential to substantially alter Australia's future role in the Pacific.

Mr Hayden and Mr Beazley met privately with Mr Jean-Marie Tjibaou, vice-president of New Caledonia's Government Council, the territory's highest elected official and the man tipped to become premier or president of an independent New Caledonia.

They discussed Australia's attitude to granting a new New Caledonian airline, Air Cal International, and traffic rights in Melbourne and Brisbane.

But it had greater overtones than future landing rights.

Mr Tjibaou has no official authority to speak abroad for New Caledonia. As a French possession, New Caledonia's diplomatic interests must be channelled through the French Foreign Minister, Mr Cheysson, whom Mr Hayden met in Paris last month.

Authority

But the New Caledonian leader sought the unofficial exchange of ideas with Mr Hayden as the representative of New Caledonia's closest and largest neighbor.

"I have no authority beyond the reef," he said. "But I feel we must establish contacts with Australia as New Caledonians rather than always through the French."

Officially, such discussion of New Caledonian activities can only be conducted between France and Australia (and will be on June 20) but as Mr Tjibaou points out, New Caledonia will not be represented.

Mr Tjibaou stressed the airline venture was a matter of local initiative, in no way relating to France's relationship with New Caledonia.

He told the Australian ministers that New Caledonians shared the Australian view of the Pacific and underlined the economic importance to the territory of Australian tourists.

Mr Hayden and Mr Beazley were encouraging he said.

For obvious reasons of diplomacy, the Australian Government will not comment on the unofficial talks but its response will be revealed when the French and Australian aviation authorities discuss it later this month.

The French Secretary of State for Overseas Territories, Mr Georges Lemoines, has already told the New Caledonians he approves of their airline scheme.

Tourists

New Caledonia's tourists are mostly Australians (22,500 annually), and the industry is second only to nickel mining in importance to the territory's economy.

There are two UTA flights and one Qantas flight each week from Sydney to Noumea, and two Air Pacific flights from Brisbane each week. New Caledonian tourist officials believe they can double the number of Australian tourists visiting their islands within 12 months.

To this end, they are launching a $300,000 advertising campaign in Sydney and Melbourne on June 26, in which both Qantas and UTA will participate.

The problem with the existing arrangement however, is that the air carriers lack flexibility, the New Caledonian authorities believe.

Air Cal International plans to lease 727 or 737 aircraft from Air Nauru, which the New Caledonians hope would make the route more economical than it has proved to the major carriers flying 747s and DC-10s.

Ironically, Air Nauru already flies direct from Melbourne to Noumea, where the aircraft are refuelled before continuing their journey, but passengers are not permitted to embark or disembark there because Air Nauru does not have traffic rights.

CSO: 4200/713

PNG SUPPORTS CHINA ON VIETNAM

Melbourne THE AGE in English 15 Jun 83 p 9

[Article by Mark Baker]

[Text]

PEKING. — Papua New Guinea is backing China in its opposition to the resumption of aid to Vietnam.

It is believed to be the first time PNG has taken a stand on a major foreign policy issue at odds with Australia's position.

Australia is consulting the ASEAN countries, the United States and China before deciding whether to implement the Labor Party's policy commitment to restore aid to Vietnam, despite its continued occupation of Kampuchea.

The PNG Foreign Minister, Mr Rabbie Namaliu, has told the Chinese that his Government shares China's view that the resumption of aid to Vietnam would not help solve the Kampuchean question.

"We are inclined to take sides with those countries which feel that Vietnam should be isolated, and that any direct bilateral aid should be discouraged," he told an official banquet in Peking.

"Papua New Guinea strongly believes that total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny, and a commitment by all States to non-interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are essential for a just and lasting solution."

Mr Namaliu is on a one-week official visit to China, the first since he was appointed Foreign Minister after the return to power of the Government of Mr Michael Somare in last year's national elections.

The strengthening of the relationship between the two countries has been underlined by China's decision to upgrade the status of its diplomatic post in Port Moresby from a charges d'affairs to that of a full ambassador.

The head of PNG's Foreign Ministry, Mr Paulius Matane, confirmed that the new Chinese ambassador would arrive in Port Moresby within a couple of weeks and PNG was keen to station an ambassador in Peking as soon as economic circumstances improved.

Mr Matane said the two countries would tonight sign an agreement on expanded technical co-operation, and that China had agreed to more than double its imports of copper from PNG to about 44,000 tonnes this year.

During last night's banquet the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr Wu Xueqian, repeated China's stance that unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea must be the basis for a political settlement of the issue.

"Recently in the international community there has been a lot of talk and efforts designed to bring about a political settlement to the Kampuchea issue," Mr Wu said. "The well intentioned desire for the realisation and maintenance of peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region is understandable."

But he said that any settlement proposals that deviated from the precondition of Vietnamese troop withdrawal would "only inflate the arrogance of the Vietnamese aggressors and impair efforts to seek a genuine settlement".

Mr Wu said China cherished friendly relations with South Pacific countries and had always supported them in their struggle to win and safeguard national independence.

Mr Namaliu said there had been a "marked improvement" in trade and diplomatic relations with China since PNG gained its independence.

Papua and New Guinea, former territories of Australia, became independent in 1975. The country is still the biggest single recipient of Australian aid. The Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, announced last week that that aid would be increased by $20 million to $273 million in 1983-84.

AAP-Reuter reports from Bangkok that the United Nations under-secretary, General Rafeeuddin Ahmed, started talks with senior Thai officials today on ways of resolving the Kampuchean conflict.

CSO: 4200/712

GOVERNMENT TO MAKE 'DETAILED ASSESSMENT' OF ASEAN BEFORE JOINING

Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY in English 2 Jul 83 p 2

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 30 June--Papua-New Guinea (PNG) will make a "detailed assessment" of the just-concluded Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) conference before it decides to apply for membership in the regional grouping, PNG Foreign Minister Rabbie Namaliu said here.

Three-day visit

Namaliu was speaking on his arrival here last night from Bangkok where he attended the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting as an observer. He is here for a three-day visit on his way home.

He said that PNG, as an observer of the ASEAN conferences since 1976, "fully understood the issues" confronting the association, which groups Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

Namaliu said that Papua-New Guinea, also in the Asia-Pacific region, considered itself "very close" to ASEAN. It was "deeply concerned" over developments in the region and fully supported ASEAN's efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian problem.

While here, Namaliu will meet Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie. NAB/AFP

CSO: 4200/717

LETTER WARNS OF SOVIET PENETRATION OF UNIONS

Honiara SOLOMON STAR in English 6 Jul 83 p 2

[Text]

Sir - While the nation is proceeding to celebrate its fifth Independence Anniversary perhaps we should view the course we have taken since 7th July 1978 in our foreign contacts.

Having just left the warm arms of Great Britain then we continued to maintain a stable tie with the West a relationship that had produced many worthwhile assistance in various fields.

The question is where are we now? The answer may not be too easy yet it's not so difficult that no one can asses it. Immediately after this Govt came into power the Prime Minister went on air to greet and assure the nation of his government's leadership aspirations and innovations. Lost in the propaganda he assured the nation of other untapped sources of aid which could be sought should the need arises.

Mentioning in particular Russia Cuba and Libya. Later on this was cleverly categorised as "slip of tongue". Could this be the beginning of the Shift Left.

The Political marriage between PAP and NADEPA also brought about an interesting ingredient into our Foreign Policy. PAP who advocates free-enterprise (capitalism) signing in with NADEPA who believes in state control socialism in itself warrants some bizzare thoughts.

NADEPA is the Political Arm of S.I.N.U.W., Russia is the "Big Brother" as far as their connection abroad is concern.

They affilate with the World Federation of Trade Unions which is a communist instrument and has its headquarter in Moscow.

Why they are blind to see the surpression of Union activities in Poland (the "Big Brother" is involved) is a mystery.

Over the years many of our Union Leaders have gone to U.S.S.R. and Cuba, could they be the importing agents of Russian Socialism, why not?

Recently a senior Union Official returned from Russia and made a proposal to transplant the Political system there into our country a statement which rocked the Christian country.

To understand a political concept often one has to study for one or two years let alone the political system of Russia, could anyone be an authority on Russian political system after two weeks, sounds like "Alice in Wonder Land".

What could compelled individuals and groups to promote communism? My simple answer is Laziness and failure to own. Sharing is a concept used as a vehcile to mobilize support.

This occurs in the process of getting a mandate to rule but as soon as that happen then sharing is often thrown in the background. State control an important feature of communism is already eating into our system, like white ant on a Wooden house.

I warn Solomon Islands to be more cautious. My last piece of advice is directed against a statement made where if you join the S.I.N.U.W. you do not automatically support NADEPA, that is all very well but who can deny that S.I.N.U.W. is a Political power base of NADEPA.

It would be advisable for Honiara Board and Malaita Board teachers to get a copy of this issue and digest the content of this brief.

James Akomane,
Honiara.

CSO: 4200/711

SOLOMON ISLANDS SUPPORTS MELANESIAN FEDERATION

Honiara SOLOMON ISLANDS GOVERNMENT MONTHLY MAGAZINE in English 30 Jun 83 p 11

[Text]

Solomon Islands still maintains its stand that there is a clear need for a single regional organisation in the South Pacific.

This was said by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Mr. Francis Saemala during discussions on the Secretary General's Review of the South Pacific Commission (SPC) held in Noumea, New Caledonia recently.

He said that the need for a single regional organisation was not recognised or appreciated in this present Review, but he said it was clear that the Review was strong on its stand for self-perpetuation.

Mr. Saemala stated that the Review was acceptable to a certain extent but needed some tidying up.

He said that the Review in its totality has avoided the central issue which is the important need to work towards an effective single regional organisation.

Mr. Saemala in his opening speech said that he welcomed the review and was grateful that one of the important points which other countries in the region have been voicing in the past, privately to the Secretary-General and in meetings of SPC has been taken into account.

This is the proposal to amalgamate the Committee of Representatives of Participating Governments (CRPG).

Mr. Saemala stressed that the point regarding traditional responsibilities of the SPC and Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) clearly showed that SPC concentrates on issues relating to resources survey and assessment, and management for conservation purposes, while FFA is responsible for the legal, economic and political aspects of fisheries development and management.

"Therefore what we should wish to see is a gradual handing over of fisheries activities and the resources that go with them to FFA", he said.

Mr. Saemala said SPC should concentrate on fisheries activities in non-Forum areas.

"We earnestly urged SPC to take note of this and that it must go down in the records of this meeting", he said.

CSO: 4200/711

SOLOMON ISLANDS, VANUATU TALKS ON MELANESIAN FEDERATION

Honiara SOLOMON ISLANDS GOVERNMENT MONTHLY MAGAZINE in English 30 Jun 83 p 6

[Text]

The concept of a Melanesian Alliance between Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands was the main topic discussed by two Prime Ministers, Father Walter Lini of Vanuatu and Mr. Solomon Mamaloni during their informal talks in Honiara on May 25.

Other matters also discussed were exchanges of information between Solomon Islands and Vanuatu Government, common land tenure problems affecting the two countries and Vanuatu and Solomon Islands Airline Services.

The talks also touched several issues to be brought up at the South Pacific Forum meeting to be held in Australia in August.

But other important issues and details of the talks have not been released by the Prime Minister's Office.

However, it is understood that Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Mr. Mamaloni might visit Vanuatu in July to follow up matters they have discussed, before attending the Forum Meeting in Australia.

Father Lini and family have been spending a week holiday in Solomon Islands particularly on Sikaiana Island, the home of Mrs. Lini where they had spent two days. The family also spent a day at Auki, Malaita Province as guest of the Premier of Malaita Province, Mr. Stephen Tonafalea.

While in Auki, Father Lini visited the Church of Melanesia Hospital, Fauabu in West Kwara'ae.

Father Lini and his family returned to Vanuatu on May 25 to attend an extraodinary session of the, Vanuatu Parliament on May 30. The family had initially planned to return on May 29.

CSO: 4200/711

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF MAMALONI GOVERNMENT

Honiara SOLOMON STAR in English 6 Jul 83 pp 6, 24 & 25

[Article by P. Kapini]

[Text]

This paper attempts to give a one-mans view on some aspects of the Mamaloni Government since it took over power in the second half of 1981 and up to now, mid 1983.

No one government will fail to inform its people of what it has achieved; this has been repeatedly done by the government of the day, to the extent that only in his speech in Parliament two weeks ago, The Hon. the Prime Minister (PM) again said that his government is the first government ever to have achieved more within a short period of time.

There is no doubt that people of Solomon Islands will like to know what these achievements are, for certainly they cannot be millstones around the neck of his government which prevented it from giving its full attention to the more pressing needs of this country and its people

In that particular address the head of the government again relished another opportunity to extol the virtues of the present government.

In the same speech his deputy battled with MPs of the opposing side to government who provoked the Prime Ministers' statements and added but with words of the mouth that his government is not doing nothing but doing 'something'.

If the Mamaloni government does not do nothing, then what are the kind of 'somethings' it has been doing?

We need therefore to find out and hence advertise.

Political Scene - rot that has set in:

The Government so far sat three times since September 1981, when it assumed power although it has called for more meetings.

The reason for the various postponements was due to continual travel overseas by members of the Cabinet and hence less time was given to Parliament Business.

Participation in both economic and political development if occured today, is not reflected by any form of devolution, distribution, productivity and redirection as outlined by the government, as its major objectives.

They exist on the other hand as symbols and appear ceremonial in the numerous speeches read out to the nation from day to day, incidentally without any, if at all, instrumental content for the would-be beneficiaries, the people of this nation at large.

Alas! rumbling excuses and political propaganda are taking their toll.

Let us look at the beginning of each Parliament sitting today.

The organizers, the Ministers of Government would ask in advance for MPs and members of public that parliament would sit on such and such a date.

Now a days every opening of Parliament will begin with the Speech from the Throne - the pet speech of the era.

The Royal SI Police will have to bring their Guard of Honour and Band except drumers and dancers; loud speakers set up, important guests, dress up their best and gather in the chamber to listen to the Speech and perhaps witness whether their MPs were able to get into Honiara in time for the meeting.

No doubt the PM is pleased each time this is done but may be for his own good.

To people who understand about the present government - in most cases they attend these openings, not because they want to hear the speeches neither because of their love for political elite or the national government, but out of curiosity and enjoyment of a festive occasion.

So that this aspect of national politics is recreation and not political participation.

There is nothing wrong about advocating changes but what new changes are these and when will they be felt?

Do we in fact have the right people to bring about these changes?

On seperate issues, we have heard prominent Ministers of the government saying one thing or the other.

In the most recent debate on a motion of vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, the Minister for Finance made a plea to all Hon. MPs to honour and safe guard the dignity and

respect of the National Constitution.

Party alone

He argued that motions of the nature should only be moved if they really warrant their being moved.

Just as well he said it himself for it was him and his party alone who have had the opportunity of doing exactly what he warns the members against.

Why not he be asked to eat his cake in full and give the rest to the devil?

The total number of no confidence motions on the PM since Independence is now five.

Three out of these came from the Nationalist Democratic Party (NADEPA) one of whom was the Minister, when he was also at that time the Leader of the Opposition.

The national constitution experiences for the first time its darkest moment since Independence.

Would we say that the darkest moment coincides with the present government in power? The first motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister a year ago already protested alleged corruption by some of the government Ministers.

Just recently three Ministers were sacked.

No definite reasons were given but they could either be Ministers not listening to the PM's orders or due to their involvement with foreign businessmen.

One government Minister committed government to a fine of $5,000.00 for abuse of power.

For some curious reasons, he was not sacked.

One Minister, before he was sacked went to prison but then was released before his term of sentence was due.

Unfortunately he was sent back to complete his prison term because the Committee on Prerogative of Mercy did not comply with the constitutional procedures.

For the first time the National Constitution was being tempered with.

Next time we hope that those responsible in their positions to show examples to the rest of our people to honour and respect our constitution.

Provincial Government - a fallacy:

The wave which had once heavily laiden with our people's expectation for more autonomy, power and voice, subsided unfortunately too little a distance out from the shores of our province.

This is very sad.

In terms of our political development it is very unsatisfactory for it had never been intended to be used by one or two people to fashion it the way they like.

If more say, which can be interpreted to mean that we allow our people in the provinces to inform and request from the Central government through a less costly system then surely the country would not be needing that many Ministers and mini-Ministers.

We have now come to a stage where for every Minister's post created, equal number of public service posts will have to be upgraded.

In terms of finance this is incredible.

I believe our people in the provinces are simply being confused if not forced upon them the kind of power only one or two 'big men' are keen to possess for it is the only way they can live.

But to let the cat out of his case, the power the few big men think they can spare, is the very power they would not surender or even prepare to share with others.

The biggest number of Ministers ever in SI Parliament serve as first ordeal.

What do Provincial Ministers do?

Could they be recruited in to Cabinet in order that the MP consolidate his power?

This means that his seat is secured and he knows that.

At times when he argues his policies out, it invites animosities in parliament amongest the opposition and even the government backbenchers, because the Ministers themselves have been observed to be left completely in the dark.

Questions asked about Provincial projects in Parliament, had been tossed here and there amongst national and provincial ministers.

The provinces have also created for themselves mini-ministers.

They turn now to living in towns instead of organising and dealing first hand with their people in the villages.

What effect then will this have on the Provincial Government system?

With almost every political organisation making promises and simultaneously calling into question the promises of others, do the people come to expect new or unusual things of government?

It seems that the government of the day or its leaders for that matter are being over powered by the nation of decentralisation.

Their ideals have undermined real constraints, factors such as manpower and finance to single out two most obvious and important considerations.

Politically, it is a hard slap on the face of the PM whose propaganda of decentralisation is said to be shunned by his inability to direct the process into a less costly and bearable system.

The country as a result has allowed itself for more beauracracy in administration and unnecessary expenditure on political ministers at the expense of more and improved services.

While our people in the villages throughout SI pin their hopes on stronger, wiser and better government, other bretheren who unfortunately have had the taste of high status in government cling to the like of getting more for themselves for practically doing nothing.

Economy-Share of National Cake:

SI now has a Minister of Finance who is a qualified economist.

This however does not mean very much to any body who is eager to know more about his economy.

One thing for certain is that any government will like to carry out certain tasks; we know too well, the Government's Programme of Action is full of these; but we may be constrained for lack of funds.

This is something the Minister of Finance has never admitted.

First, the revenue and undirectly the condition of

the economy places certain limits on the attainability of projected goals.

Secondly the distribution of funds among various sectors of the economy is not always amendable to rapid restructuring that the government of the day places so much emphasis on.

Let us not make things too difficult. The government for example constantly drum into our ears about economic growth.

Our people have yet to have a concise explanation of what induces economic growth and most importantly what retards it, though I accept there are plenty of theories.

It is not enough to attempt compromise on everything in order to fulfill the Programme of Action.

Economic Development if it is what we are trying to explain to our people is about distribution of the national income.

We need to examine now whether the gap between how much a person in the village earns and the person employed in the modern sector.

While a large number of workers in the modern sector experience comparatively large increases in income, the traditional sector or those who are not engaged in formal employment continue to suffer.

The latter comprises the majority of people in S.I.

Members of our trade unions will agree that they are at advantage, beccause they can bargain for increases in their pay when they are hit hard by inflation whereas our own people in the villages cannot, despite drastic fall in prices of cash crops like copra and cocoa in the market.

I feel the present finance minister exaggerates on facts concerning inflation.

I'd ask people to look at the drop in the rate of inflation with the reduction in the number of people employed and hence productivity.

Inflation depends very much, though not entirely on demand, and if demand drops because of lack of economic activity and therefore less people being employed then what?

This is being very simple, but too simple even to find out from the people in the villages whether services they enjoyed during the past few yecrs are still there.

The services to the provinces have dropped quiet considerably.

They have yet to collect some money from the Central Government, normally channelled through the Provincial Development Fund (PDF) for some services.

This is talking about development finance that affect them more directly, but perhaps the present government now has its new style or procedure of distributing these finances, instead of beginning of year, towards the end of the year.

Planning under these conditions become doubly difficult and fiscal impotency then occur 'between the conception and the creation'.

The year of fiscal measures!

Conclusion - to be responsible and committed:

Characteristic of the present government is their childish attitude of blaming the previous government for their self inadequecies - the government 'bilong iu fala ia nao' attitude.

In my honest opinion and it might serve as reference for some who care to listen to other people's views in that no political government, no matter how radically it wishes to break with the past can afford to abandon all the works of its predecessor.

If this practice of passing on the back continues to be entertained by the present government leadership, then indirectly are they not saying that there have not yet been any commitment made on their part as a responsible government?

No government can fulfill their commitment when they have not made any.

CSO: 4200/711

POSSIBILITY OF PRC INVESTMENT DISCUSSED

Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 20 May 83 p 5

[Ta Mo Lo column: "Lure With a Bait and Not Lose the Bait"]

[Text] There is rather exciting news that China is interested in investing in Thailand and that it is interested in the Phetchabun Palace Complex project of the Assets Office, which is a project that is valued at 22 billion baht. It will invest together with people in the private sector. They are also interested in investing in large-scale agricultural and construction projects. If it is not a large-scale project, China is not involved.

This is not a rumor. In its 16-20 May edition, the economic journal THAN SETTHAKIT, citing Mr Thawatchai Thawonthawat, a member of the Board of Directors of the Laem Thong Finance Company LTD who, together with several other leading businessmen, recently visited China and met with the Chinese economic minister, [said that] China has expressed such as interest.

China explained that it has now changed its policy. Instead of a closed country, it is now an open country. At present, it is ready to invest abroad, such as in Thailand.

China said that even though [most of] its technology is inferior to that of other countries, some of its technology is superior to that of others. And China feels that Thailand has several favorable things, such as raw materials.

"What is important is that China feels comfortable in Thailand since businessmen and Thais have blood ties with China."

The reason that China has not yet made a definite decision is because the policy of the Thai government is not clear. For example, China is afraid that Thailand will one day change its policy, such as nationalizing [companies].

It is quite possible that China may invest in Thailand. But it is a very complex matter. The fact that China has expressed an interest in investing in the Phetchabun Palace complex project, which is a large-scale project of the Assets Office, shows that China is serious. And it probably intends to settle in at the Phetchabun Palace Complex and use it as an administrative center for Chinese investments in Thailand.

But concerning the fact that China is still hesitating, it seems that China wants to hold government-to-government negotiations and reach an initial agreement on various conditions in order to facilitate the activities and ensure safety in making investments.

Concerning the fact that China is interested in investing in Thailand, it appears that this is contrary to its new policy on economic zones, which are to be free zones to encourage other countries to invest in China. China has formulated this as a major and very serious plan. Thus, the question is: Why does China want to invest in Thailand? This must be analyzed carefully.

From the economic standpoint, China does not expect to make a profit from its investments. It is probably viewing this from the standpoint of markets. It probably wants foreign markets to which it can export technology, raw materials and basic industrial products. It will use Thailand as a market and as a transit point since Thailand's trade geography is very large and since there are businessmen here who are market specialists and who can get along with China.

But concerning having China invest in Thailand, we have to talk about whether they will do so on an item-by-item basis or on a project basis. Because, frankly, China's industrial technololgy is inferior to that of Thailand. Thailand can, however, accept some Chinese technology, such as new and small-scale industries, that is superior to that of Thailand.

As for agricultural activities, concerning techniques, China should learn from Thailand. Similarly, concerning construction activities, Thai architecture, engineering and craftsmanship have reached the level of internatinal standards. The only thing lacking is government support.

Concerning China wanting to invest in Thailand, it looks as if China is hoping to benefit politically rather than economically. China has been a closed country for a long time. If it does want to open its doors and stick its nose out to smell the air outside, Thailand is the most suitable place for this in terms of both political geography and relations at the level of the people, who get along with China quite well. Stated simply, there is no anti-Chinese sentiment in Thailand.

Besides this, Thailand is an important strategic point in Southeast Asia. It is China's back door. If China can gain a foothold in Thailand, even if this is based on trade, China will feel more comfortable. And this will be a means by which it can expand its political influence in the future.

However, from the standpoint of mutural economic benefits, we should not refuse to allow China to invest here since China is a huge country with a population of 600 million people. And it too is a developing country.

China is a huge market. Thailand is just as interested in China as a market as it is in Thailand. We should be able to cooperate. Perhaps there will be new activity to have Japan, our "old friend" and exploiter, review its behavior.

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COLUMNIST QUESTIONS OFFICIALS SUPPORT OF SIHANOUK

Bangkok SIAM RATH in Thai 23 May 83 p 16

[Behind the Political Keyhole column by Robert Niep: "Sihanouk Comes to Thailand Frequently. Is Thailand Good Or Bad?"]

[Text] I wonder if anyone feels the same way I do? I have felt stifled for a long time now. I admit that I have little knowledge about foreign policy matters or about foreign affairs. I have no experience with such things. And I lack talent in this field. But I still have "feelings" and thoughts. And as a member of the "mass media" and as a citizen, I have the right to speak out. This country is a democracy, not a dictatorship.

Frankly, there is one matter that I have put up with many times now. It is constantly coming to my attention. As for my feelings, I can only say that I am so upset and confused that I am speechless.

What is it that has upset me so much? It is the frequent trips to Thailand by Norodom Sihanouk, the Kampuchean leader. He comes so often that it has now become boring.

Every time that he comes, we--Thailand--particularly senior people in the government, have to welcome him grandly and wine and dine him. Each time, arrangements are made for him to give interviews, and news reports are spread throughout the world. And Sihanouk uses Thailand as a stage. Everytime he comes, he makes a speech. He talks endlessly.

I can't find any reason. There have been many announcements and when he comes we say we will be "neutral" and that we join with Asean in this. But concerning what is happening, is there anyone who is sure whether there is real neutrality? Why?

Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and even the Philippines are all close by. We should take turns and build stages for Sihanouk there too, instead of having him use just Thailand.

Have you noticed that the thing that we are constantly faced with and that makes Thais angry is the matter of the "refugees?"

At a time when large numbers of Thais are very poor and the people in the country are experiencing great problems, we still have the heart to act in a humanitarian way toward the Kampucheans and Vietnamese who come and swell the refugee centers. These people eat three meals a day and give back nothing in return! This is just the opposite of "Thais," who are so poor it is pitiful. Where is the humanitarianism here? Where is justice? At a time when Sihanouk's country has split apart and there is no real country, Sihanouk continues to travel here and there in comfort, not wanting to suffer any hardships. His tastes are very high-class; he uses only very expensive things. From head to toe, he is immaculate.

He does not act at all like some leaders whose countries have split apart.

We have been "neutral" for too long now. We should study the matter so that we are clear about what "neutrality" means. I am not sure about the shells that Vietnam fires into Thailand like raindrops. Are our fellow Thais and our soldiers being offered as a sacrifice?

Is this happening because Thais are not neutral? Mr Minister of Foreign Affairs Sitthi Sawetsila and Mr Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon, in all respect, what can be done to maintain real neutrality? And is there any chance of our claiming that we are not prepared to welcome the groups of some leaders and certain people?

Concerning being neutral, we must continue to be just and to act in a humanitarian way. But these things must be shared with others. Don't othere countries have such qualities, or are they to be found only here?

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ECONOMIC LOSSES HIGH IN VIOLATIONS OF SRV, BURMA WATERS

Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 24 May 83 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Fishermen Who Encroach On Territorial Waters Are Harming the Economy"]

[Text] Mr Wanit Warikun, the deputy director-general of the Department of Fisheries, talked with reporters at the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives on the morning of 23 May. He told them that, last year, 50 Thai fishing boats had been seized for violating the territorial waters of neighboring countries. And since the beginning of 1983, a total of 22 Thai fishing boats, valued at 135 million baht, have been seized. Of these, 14 were seized by Vietnam, seven were seized by Buram and one was seized by India.

The deputy director-general of the Department of Fisheries said that, at present, neighboring countries, particularly Vietnam and Burma, are taking additional measures to control Thai fishing boats. They are using speedboats to patrol their coasts. And they are using war weapons to suppress this in a strict manner. Some Thai fishermen have been hurt and some have been killed. The boats are still being held, and they are being put to use by these countries. This has resulted in our suffering economic losses. Thus, the Department of Fisheries has asked boat owners not to fish in the territorial waters of neighboring countries such as Burma, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Indonesia, India and Bangladesh. The purpose of this is to keep assets from being lost and to keep international relations from turning sour.

As for carrying on joint fishing operations with other countries, Mr Wanit said that, concerning carrying on joint fishing activities with India, Thai fishermen have already made contact with them. As for Bangladesh, we are not engaging in joing fishing activities directly. But we are doing this through Singapore. At present, about 20 Thai fishing boats are fishing in Bangladesh waters.

Mr Wanit Warikun, the deputy director-general of the Department of Fisheries, said that the Department of Fisheries has asked for 2 million baht from the Agricultural Welfare Fund in order to establish a station for raising chicken mites in Chachoengsao Province on approximatley 200 rai.

As for why it is necessary to establish this station, Mr Wanit said that this is because we must import about 10 million baht worth of mites a year from Brazil, China and Canada in order to raise white snakehead and shrimp.

The deputy director-general of the Department of Fisheries said that, besides this, the Department of Fisheries has implemented a program to encourage people to raise mites in the salt flats and in the brackish areas in order to reduce imports. The capital needed to raise mites does not exceed 10,000 baht per rai.

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ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF SRV SEEN AS UNSUCCESSFUL

BANGKOK SIAM MAI in Thai 24 Jun 83 pp 41, 42

[Article: "Has Closing the Trade Door On Vietnam Really Put Much Pressure on Them?"]

[Text] The visit to Thailand and to other members of Asean by Nguyen Co Thach, the Vietnamese minister of Foreign affairs, who stopped off in Thailand for 3 days from 8 to 10 June, has once again generated much excitement in trading circles about whether Thailand should open trade relations with Vietnam. This has resulted in several prominent people in government circles expressing widely differing views.

In particular, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sitthi Sawetsila and Deputy Prime Minister Phichai Rattakun expressed very different views, and this is something that should not have happened since both are in the four-party cabinet. That is, the minister of foreign affairs thinks (it surely isn't a government policy?) that as long as Vietnam refuses to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, Thailand (Thailand alone and not Asean) will keep the trade door closed on Vietnam. As for Mr Phichai Rattakun, the deputy prime minister, he feels that the "trade leads politics" matter should be used. This latter view has received strong support from former prime minister Kriangsak Chamanan.

Admidst this confusion, I personally have to sympathize with the minister of foreign affairs because his policy, as the person who must take action, is in conflict with the policies (or personal views; I'm not sure) of the leaders of two major parties, the Democrat Party and the National Democracy Party. We don't know when the conflict arose. But this dispute has clearly created an image of disunity in the four-party government governing matters of policy in general and not just about the foreign affairs policy, which the press has made a great issue of. These doubts have made us think a great deal about our system of defense against an invasion and made us wonder how united and strong we would be.

Thailand is a militarily strategic area that is vital to Asean. It is a front-line country that shares a border with the communist countries of Indochina. Thus, the implementation of Thailand's policies that concern

these Indochina countries is a matter that requires great delicacy for the stability and security of Thailand itself and for the safety of Asean in general. And the good relations between the members of Asean have been strengthened recently. An important focal point for interests in general is keeping Thailand safe from invasion by the Indochina countries, particularly Vietnam. Because if Thailand is weak or if something happens to Thailand, no country in this region will be able to withstand the foreign forces.

Concerning trade between these countries, no one can deny that this is important in the present economic system. Every country is trying to open more trade markets since it is only through trade that countries can gain economic prosperity and create employment for the people in the country. It is not only underdeveloped countries like Thailand that must open the trade door with other countries as wide as possible. Even developed countries such as the members of the Common Market, or EEC, and Australia are now making a great effort to initiate trade with Vietnam and Indochina after long watching Asean's policy of boycotting [Vietnam]. This can be seen from their attempts to solve the Kampuchean problem as quickly as possible. In particular, at the beginning of this year, the EEC said that it would give economic aid to Vietnam. But Asean appealed to them not to do this and so nothing came of this.

Some members of Asean, which everyone knows refers to Singapore, are actively trading with the Indochina countries. If this is discussed in depth, it can be seen that it is essential economically that Singapore engage in trade with all countries in order to distribute its goods and purchase raw materials. This is because Singapore does not have any domestic resources. Thus, Singapore is taking advantage of Thailand's policy of not trading with Vietnam to benefit itself. It has played the role of middleman in purchasing goods from Thailand and selling them to Vietnam to the point where this is being talked about throughout the region.

As one of the members of Asean, Singapore is in effect the open port of Asean. And Singapore is doing more than just purchasing goods from Thailand and other Asean countries and selling them to Vietnam. Singapore is also purchasing articles made from jute, that is gunny bags, from the People's Republic of China and selling them to Vietnam and competing for Thai gunny bag markets abroad. China is well aware of this.

It is clear that Thailand's policy of not trading with [Vietnam] is being deliberately disregarded, even by other members of Asean.

Because of Asean's lack of unity concerning trade with Vietnam, it will definitely not be possible to force Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea as is the goal.

Using an economic boycott against some country in order to gain some political benefit seems to be a very outdated and silly method.

A very recent example of the failure of a boycott is the case of the United States and its European allies boycotting the Soviet Union. This occurred in 1980 when Jimmy Carter was president. In particular, the United States implemented a total grain embargo against the Soviet Union in order to pressure the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afganistan. But the Soviet Union was easily able to purchase grain from small free-world countries instead. U.S. farmers cursed the government and Carter suffered a resounding defeat in his bid for re-election.

That economic boycott by the United States and its allies lasted a long time, and several of the allied countries could not persist with this. For example, West Germany and several of the other allied countries decided to implement an independent policy and purchase gas from the Soviet Union. Germany sold much gas pipeline to the Soviet Union. Even though it had received a strong warning from the United States, Germany did not listen. If it had listened, it would probably have become poor.

Thus, it can be seen that implementing an economic boycott against a country is now an old and very outdated method since our world is constantly getting smaller. Trade contacts can be made easily and quickly. Implementing an economic boycott against a country will not benefit the economic situation in the country.

What I have written here does not mean that I oppose the policy of the minister of foreign affairs. It just means that I do not agree with the method used to put pressure on Vietnam. The method now being used will not achieve anything. Other methods that all the members of Asean can really unite on should be found so that these other allied countries can really act in accord with the one policy.

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POLICE CHIEF'S TRANSFER SEEN AS MOI-HAN-ATHIT CONFLICT

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 19 Jun 83 p 3

[Article: "The Satun Dispute, a Problem That Still Exists"]

[Text] "Sitthi-Phisan want him to go show his abilities elsewhere. Ministry of Interior hits a snag in transferring the police chief of Satun. Athit orders halt." That was MATICHON'S front-page headline on 13 June 1983, which was the first of the reports on the transfer of Police Colonel Atthaphon Suwannawong, the chief of police of Satun Province. And all last week, MATICHON published front-page articles on this matter almost every day, as have all the other newspapers.

The Beginning, Background of the Matter

The reason why the transfer of this police officer has become such a sensational story is that it involves a "dispute" between the government units concerned, with the ultimate difference of opinion being between those who favor "transferring" him and those who do not, that is, the ISOC, which is headed by General Athit Kamlangek, the RTA CINC, in his capacity as the director of the Communist Activities Suppression Command, and the Ministry of Interior, which is the direct superior of this police officer.

"When the Ministry of Interior received a report that Police Colonel Atthaphon Chaemsuwannawong, the chief of police in Satun Province was aiding Mr X, an influential person in Satun Province who was engaged in trafficking in smuggled goods, narcotics and other things, the Ministry of Interior launched a series of investigations into this matter. It appears that Police Colonel Atthaphon Chaemsuwannawong, the chief of police of Satun Province, is in fact guilty of such behavior. The minister of interior has considered the matter and has issued a directive in order to solve this problem. He has ordered that Police Colonel Atthaphon quickly be transferred to another locality or region. This is being submitted to you for your consideration and implementation in accord with this directive. The results are to be reported to the Ministry of Interior."

This was the letter sent by Mr Phisan Mulasatsathon, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, to Police General Narong Mahanon, the director-general of the Police Department, on 26 January 1983. But on 4 March 1983, the situation changed because General Athit sent a letter to Police General Narong, which stated that:

"The ISOC has conducted a thorough investigation and can testify to the fact that the record of Police Colonel Atthaphon Chaemsuwannawong, the chief of police of Satun Province, is spotless. He is diligent in his work, he has achieved good results in security, defense and suppression activities and he has helped develop the localities in Satun Province, which has benefited the country in accord with Policy 66/1980. Thus, it is requested that the transfer of Police Colonel Atthaphon be stopped."

Then, the police sent a letter to the ISOC. The letter said that the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, through the Ministry of Interior, Region 4, and the S.M.C. and the N.R.M. [expansion unknown] had requested the transfer of this police officer, claiming that he was not diligent in his work and that he was involved in illegal activities. The ISOC conducted another careful investigation and came up with the same results as before. However, it did find that he was having some conflicts with the governor and deputy governor of Satun Province. Thus, the governor wanted him transferred. The ISOC confirmed that it felt that the chief of police of Satun Province should not be transferred in order to maintain morale.

This is the unresolved "disagreement" that arose at the beginning of 1983 and that has been publicized by the newspapers. This clearly shows that the ISOC investigated this matter at least twice and still came up with facts different from those obtained by the Ministry of Interior. And so it twice asked that the transfer be "stopped."

Thus, General Athit's statement on 14 June, in which he denied having "stopped" the transfer, saying that he had only asked that this matter be reviewed or investigated in order to be fair to all sides, is "not in accord with the facts."

The Real Reason, an Unclear Answer

Based on the various stories, we have found that this matter started--although this may not be the ultimate starting point--when Mr Wirot Ratcharak, the governor of Satun Province sent a letter to Mr Anan Anantakun, the director of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, on 7 September 1982. This letter reported on the behavior of four police officials: Colonel Atthaphon, Police Master Sergeant Somchai Phonthawi, Police Master Sergeant Chattrachai Khongyen and Police Private Samakwinun Chanthachula. The latter three officials were police officials assigned to the Satun provincial police station in Muang District. The letter said that the four had done various things that were improper.

"This has been brought to your attention in order to have you consider transferring these government officials from Satun Province as quickly as possible." This was the important sentence in this letter.

Following this, the Southern Border Provincves Administrative Center conducted an investigation. The results of this investigation, which were issued on 14 December 1982, were the same as those reported by the province. And in the same period, the Ministry of Interior ordered Mr Suphayok Phanichawit, the Region 12 inspector for the Ministry of Interior who is responsible for such work in the south, to investigate the behavior of these four police officials. On 18 March 1983, Mr Anan Anantakun, the deputy undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior and the director of this center, sent a report on the behavior of these police officials to Police General Narong Mahanon.

"One behavior that is inappropriate is that they use their influence in the area to make profits illegally. For example, they have protected smugglers and merchants who have brought in goods without paying taxes. They have also supported and protected criminals and supported subordinates who have made profits illegally and made payments to them."

One section, which is a "charge" in the report by this center, mentions Police Colonel Atthaphon. It states that in addition to this, he has done other things that are not in accord with the normal way for government officials and has not done things in accord with the policies of the government and province. In conclusion, it stated that:

"The center thus feels that Police Colonel Atthaphon should be transferred." And to add to the weight of this, this letter states: "Furthermore, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon approved the transfer of Police Colonel Atthaphon from the southern border province on 2 February 1983 as detailed in top secret Memorandum OPM [Office of the Prime Minister] 0406/309 issued on 8 February, which is attached. This has been brought to your attention for consideration and implementation in accord with the order of the prime minister."

That is the background of this matter. But what is the truth? Police Colonel Atthaphon told MATICHON that the charges were totally false. And he mentioned that "this is an attempt by one side to transfer me and then bring in one of their own men."

"Actually, concerning those people, when we seized cattle and buffalos, they came and asked me to release them. I refused and so they went and urged the owners of the cattle and buffalos to file suit," said Police Colonel Atthaphon about "them." At the same time, he talked about those who have been charged with being influential people and with having received protection from him:

"If these are actually influential people who are engaged in narcotics trafficking, why haven't the governor and deputy governor and the district officers ordered the marine police or other officials to take action against them? And if I have done something wrong, why haven't I been arrested?"

The facts are still unclear, and it is not known which of the two groups of officials in Satun Province is correct and which is wrong. And so the matter will certainly move to higher echelons that will get involved and side with one of the groups.

Investigative Committees Blame Each Other. What Is Just?

On 14 June, which was the second day after this news began appearing in the newspapers, General Sitthi Chirarot, the minister of interior, stated that:

"In considering the matter of transferring the officials, I had to place my trust in the director-general of the Police Department before anyone else since he is a police official. And both the director-general of the Police Department and I had knowledge about this."

"There were conflicts within the ISOC. One side said that he did a good job while the other side said that he did not do a good job. They had their conflict among themselves. Thus, I accepted this as data, but I had the right to consider this matter since this was the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and the Police Department.

"I have not formed an investigative committee. I have entrusted the matter to the director-general of the Police Department. He will make a recommendation to me."

It can be concluded that the Ministry of Interior will not form an investigative committee. Rather, the matter will be handled by the director-general of the Police Department, who will make a recommendation. That same day, Police General Narong said that "because the various data that the Police Department has received about this police colonel do not all agree, the Police Department has turned the matter over to the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior should form an investigative committee to get at the facts."

It can be seen that the two people responsible have said something "different" concerning an investigative committee. And much confusion was created when Police General Narong talked with reporters at Nakhon Ratchasima on 15 June and told them that, at present, we have to wait for the results of the investigation. The results will then be submitted to the Ministry of Interior.

This statement by Police General Narong shows that the Police Department has formed an investigative committee and that a report will be sent to the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior later on.

But on 17 June, Mr Phisan Mulasatsathon, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, made another statement about this matter. He said that the Ministry of Interior has formed an investigative committee. At present, various sectors are submitting names. On this committee is Mr Anan Anantakun, the deputy undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior for special affairs, who will serve as the chairman. The committee will also be composed of four to five members from the Police Department, the Fourth Army Area and the Office of the Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Interior. There will not be any representatives from the ISOC.

From a state of not knowng who was responsible for forming an investigative committee, it has now been revealed that it is the Ministry of Interior, which once favored a "transfer" and which clearly stated what behavior was involved, that has formed the committee. And what is important is that Mr Anan Anantakun will serve as the chairman and that there will be representatives from the Fourth Army Area and the Office of the Undersecretary of State on the committee.

"Actually, the governor and deputy governor of Satun Province were in the same class at the High-Echelon Administrators School. And the deputy governor is a friend of the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior," said Police Colonel Atthaphon about these poeple in the province who have connections with people in the Ministry of Interior.

Considering the fact that [this committee will be composed of] Mr Anan, a man who once made a statement about the behavior of this police official and who recommended that he be transferred, and representatives from the Fourth Army Area, which is commanded by Lieutenant General Han Linanon, who has mde it clear that this police colonel should be transferred out of the south, there is some question about how "fair" this committee will be or what kind of data it will obtain.

Conclusion, Will the Problem Go Away?

"Since I first came to the Ministry of Interior, concerning a transfer, I have never encountered such a problem as this one," said Genral Sitthi on 16 June. His meaning is clear, and it is possible to explain what has happened concerning this matter.

There is nothing yet to indicate what the results of the investigation will be. General Sitthi has said that if it turns out that he should be transferred, he will be transferred. And if he does not have the power to do this, he may have to use the power of the prime minister. But the lesson of the past is that, even though the commanding general of the Fourth Army Area, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center and the prime minister have all favored having him transferred, this police officer has still not been transferred.

And even if the results of this new investigation produce data that are contrary to the original findings of the Ministry of Interior, that is, if it finds that this police officer carried out his job well and should not be transferred, from the standpoint of the work that must be done, which requires that things be coordinated with provincial officials and with the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center and the Fourth Army Area, there may continue to be problems since even if the governor is transferred, the deputy governor, this center and the Fourth Army Area will still be there.

Clearly, this problem will not go away. And so, what is the best solution for all sides concerned?

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CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTOR OF ARMY ORGANIZATION REPORTED

Bangkok SIAM MAI in Thai 24 Jun 83 pp 16-19

[Article: "The Civil Affairs Center, Political Department, Royal Thai Army"]

[Text] It can be said that almost every time there is a new RTA CINC, the first unit whose structure will be changed is the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which is the unit that is directly responsible in fighting the communists.

But in previous periods, the changes amounted only to making minor changes in personnel. But when General Athit Kamlangek became the RTA CINC in October 1982, he began making fundamental changes in the ISOC.

This began with a conference. Officials concerned with national security affairs were called to a meeting at the Kittkhachon Conference Hall on 17 November 1982. As the director of the Communist Activities Suppression Command, General Athit Kamlangek submitted a proposal for making major changes in the structure of the ISOC in order to make this unit more efficient by eliminating excess officials and abolishing the overlapping units. Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the assistant army chief of staff for operations, was put in change of carrying out the details.

As for what resulted from this structural adjustment, tens of ISOC officials were sent back to their former posts. In the new structure, no changes were made at the upper command echelon, that is, at the level of the director of the Communist Activities Suppression command, the deputy director, the assistant director, the chief of staff, the deputy chief of staff or the assistant chief of staff. But at the lower command echelon, which was rather broad, major changes were made and only four centers remained: The Operations Center, the Intelligence Coordination Center, the Civil Affairs Center and the Support Center. All four of these centers weredirectly subordinate to the Service Center, the members of which include officers and the undersecretaries of all ministries. General Pamot Thawonchan was the center director.

Then, General Athit Kamlangek issued Order 83/1983 on 21 March 1983, which made further changes in the structure of the ISOC. In this change, which was made quietly, the major feature was the creation of an internal unit responsible for carrying on political activities in accord with Policy 66/1980. This unit was the Civil Affairs Center.

Thus, the latest structure is as follows:

1. The ISOC committee is composed of:

1.1. General Athit Kamlangek, who serves as the director of the Communist Activities Suppression Command.

1.2. General Sup Aksaranukhro, who serves as the deputy director.

1.3. General Pathom Soemsin, who serves as the first assistant director for military affairs.

1.4. General Thienchai Sirisamphan, who serves as the second assistant director for military affairs.

1.5. Mr Phisan Mulasatsathon, who serves as the assistant director for civil affairs.

1.6. Police General Narong Mahanon, who serves as the assistant director for policy affairs.

2. The internal security chief of staff: General Pamot Thawonchan is serving as the chief of staff.

3. There are five internal security deputy chiefs of staff:

3.1. The first deputy chief of staff for military affairs is Lieutenant General Prayun Bunnak. This deputy chief of staff heads the Activities Center, which controls three major centers:

3.1.1. The Intelligence Coordination Center. Lieutenant General Uthai Saengthawip is the director.

3.1.2. The Operations Center. Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut is the director.

3.1.3. The Civil Affairs Center. Lieutenant General Mana Rattanakoset is the director.

3.2. The first deputy chief of staff for civil affairs. Mr Charoenchit Na Songkhla , the deputy undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, is the deputy chief of staff.

3.3 The second deputy chief of staff for civil affairs. Mr Chalong Kalayanamit, the director-general of the Department of Local Administration, is the dpeuty chief of staff.

3.4. The second deputy chief of staff for military affairs is Lieutenant General Banchop Bunnak. Under his command is the Support Center, which controls four bureaus and one center. These are the Administrative and Personnel Bureau, the Logistics Bureau, the Assistant Accountant and Finance Bureau, the Communications Bureau and the Data Processing Center.

What is most important is the change in structure in the minor sections of the Civil Affairs Center. The operational status of this center has been raised above that of the other centers. Its structure is as follows:

Concerning the Civil Affairs Center, besides having Lieutenant General Mana Rattanakoset as the director, Major General Suwit Kanchananan is the deputy director, Major General Phiriya Charumat is the assistant director for military affiars, and Mr Wichit Laksanasomphong, the director-general of the Department of Local Administration, is the assitant director for civil affairs. These people are the members of the standing committee of the Office of the Civil Affairs Center. There is also an advisory unit composed of people at the level of director-general and divisional heads from all the ministries.

As for the sub-units of this center, it is composed of: the Civil Operations Bureau (COB), the head of which is Mr Wanlop Chaiphiphati; the Psychological Operations and Public Relations Bureau (POPRB), the head of which is Major General Laphon Siripalaka; the Internal Security Coordination Bureau (ISCB), the head of which is Major General Prayot Thawonsiri; the Self-Defense Volunteers Center (SDVC), the head of which is Lieutenant General Prathiep Thetwisan; and the Office of the Secretary of the Volunteer Defense Corps Center (OSVDCC), which is headed by Lieutenant General Mana Rattanakset.

Concerning the tasks of the Civil Affairs Center, according to this order to change the structure, this center is responsible for stipulating policies, helping formulate plans, coordinating tasks, supervising the implementation of civil affairs activities concerning politics, development and psychological operations and supervising public relations activities, training seminars, the implementation of things in accord with the People's Volunteers for Development and Self-Defense program, volunteer activities and activities aimed at helping the hill tribes.

Besides this, it is also responsible for putting all the mass movements on the democratic path, eliminating the war conditions and getting the communist terrorists and the other terrorist groups to particupate in developing the nation in a peaceful way. These things do not involve military operations.

The various sections in the Civil Affairs Center that are responsible for mass activities are the ones that will coordinate internal security activities. Their structure and different responsibilities are as follows:

1. The Training Division is composed of the Training Office, the Technical Office, the Equipment and Service Office and the Statistics and Evaluation Office.

2. The Mass Development Division is composed of the Mass Development Office and the Operations Support Office.

3. The Mass Relations Division is composed of the Mass Relations Office and the Mass Activities Support Office. This division will coordinate things with mass groups that have not had direct training.

The tasks stipulated for the Internal Security Coordination Bureau include making plans, coordinating activities, providing training and forming and leading national security movements for government officials, students, intellectuals, people in various walks of life and people in various power groups so that they are knowledgeable about and think about building and preserving national security on the political, economic, social and cultural fronts and on the combat front to defeat the communists in accord with the policies of the ISOC and the government.

The Internal Security Coordination Bureau has two main concrete tasks:

1. To provide training. The curriculum is as follows:

1.1. A course on preserving internal security. The course lasts 3 weeks. This is taught every other month.

1.2. A course for labor unions. The training lasts 5 days.

1.3. A course for administrators. The training lasts 5 days.

1.4. A course for businessmen. The course lasts 5 days and is given on the weekends.

1.5. A course for ISOC experts. The training last 3 weeks.

1.6. A course for Volunteer Defense Corps political experts. The training lasts 4 weeks.

2. To organize the masses. This is done in two ways:

2.1. By organizing people who have taken the ISOC training courses.

2.2. By organizing people from the various power groups who have been organized previously. They will be brought in to participate in order to generate ideological solidarity within a democratic system with the king at the head.

And that is not all. The scope of the work of the Civil Affairs Center extends throughout the country. It has branches--civil affairs sections that are attached to the army areas. These coordinate the activities. They are important mechanisms for supervising the masses in each of the regions. Concerning their role, provincial officials know that they have the power to control the provincial governors. And it is these sections that have succeeded in winning the masses away from the CPT.

From the duties of the Civil Affairs Center that were stipulated in the order to change the structure, it is clear that these are new tasks that are in harmony with the present situation. Concerning the results of the communist suppression activities, the ISOC has concluded that things have reached the stage of our being able to win a fundamental victory in the fight against the communists. That is, we have been able to destroy the secure bases of the CPT. Thus, military operations are now secondary in suppression activities.

At the same time, carrying on development activities, attracting the masses and carrying on psychological operations in various forms have become more important. In particular, in carrying out the tasks of the Civil Affairs Center, the main emphasis will be placed on carrying on activities in a peaceful way in accord with Policy 66/1980.

The communist suppression budget that was once used for military operations will be used to carry on continuous development activities since the Red areas are still under [communist] influence just as before even though the level of CPT violence in many of the provinces has declined.

Almost all the tasks that involve supervising and winning over the masses are the responsibility of the Civil Affairs Center. Thus, it can be said that the future role of the ISOC will be to combine all the centers and make them part of the Civil Affairs Center. And so the role of the activists will most likely become more important too.

One Young Turk officer once told SIAM MAI that the Democratic Soldiers had thought about making plans to expand the role of this center and that they had constantly tried to push this forward.

"They hoped that, in the future, the Civil Affairs Center would grow larger and play a role equal to that of the army's Political Department."

Besides this, it is worth noting that its present role overrides that of the Ministry of Interior in the localities.

It can be said that this center's role in systematically organizing the masses in the future is to imbue the masses with the way of thinking in Policy 66/1980 so that they become a political power group of the state that can really be guided and controlled. This will play a very important role for the state in the future.

This is not much different from how the masses are organized in socialist countries.

Order [illegible]
Issued on [illegible] March 1981




Civil Affairs Center
(CAC)
P.S., Civil
Affairs Center
Civil Operations
Bureau
Psychological Operations and Public
Relations Bureau
Office of the Secretary
of the Volunteer Defense
Corps Center
Internal Security
Coordination Bureau
Self-Defense
Volunteers Center

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MILITARY REGION 1 SAID TO RESIST CHINESE AGGRESSION

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 83 pp 22-30

[Article by Lieutenant General Dam Quang Trung: "Soldiers and People of Military Region 1 Resolutely Defeat Enemy's Many-Sided War of Destruction"]

[Text] The many-sided war of destruction waged by the reactionary Chinese clique in league with the U.S. imperialists has taken place in all spheres of social life and in all parts of our country. Because of the specific historical conditions in the past, the Chinese reactionaries and U.S. imperialists were able to create forces and political-social bases, etc., so the enemy have conditions and capabilities for concentrating their activities in different areas. Military Region 1 is one of the key areas in which the Chinese expansionist-hegemonist clique has conditions for carrying out the most comprehensive, most feverish sabotage against us.

Military Region 1 shares a border with China that is more than 500 kilometers long, and there are many convenient routes across the border. Traditionally, the people of the ethnic minority groups on both sides of the border had not only ethnic ties but also tribal, clan, and family ties as well as extremely close economic ties. They relied on one another and assisted one another in producing and in building their lives.

But even in that period the Chinese rulers, with their expansionist, hegemonistic plot, took advantage of the fine friendship between the people of the two countries by means of the groups of cadres they sent to assist us economically, culturally, militarily, etc., especially to build roads and bridges, and to build a number of economic bases, in order to plant an infrastructure and bribe lackeys within our ranks and our territory to serve their long-range plot to overthrow and annex our country. They took advantage of the ethnic ties between the ethnic groups on both sides of the border to create contradictions and division among the ethnic groups and between the ethnic minority people in the border area and the ethnic community of Vietnam. Especially, they sought all ways to incite the people of Chinese ethnic group -- who are present in rather large numbers in the northern mountain region -- and to both seduce them and force them to oppose the Vietnamese ethnic group. They cut off the mutual economic relations to create difficulties in the people's lives and take advantage of those difficulties to create pressure, inveigle, and bribe.

Because mountain chains and rivers cross the border, the northern border area in general and Military Region 1 specifically provide the Chinese reactionaries with the most favorable conditions for sabotaging our defense and for exerting a continuous, direct military threat against us. Thus if in anti-aggression war Military Region 1 is the front line in the direct contest of arms with the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, today it is also a key area in their many-sided war of sabotage. There the reactionaries in the Chinese ruling circles are capable of and have conditions for concentrating forces and launching all-round attacks -- militarily, economically, politically, and ideologically -- against us in order to carry out their plot to form a "dual government" at the basic level and advance toward occupying an area, concentrating ethnic minority people in it, and setting up a so-called "autonomous zone" to serve as the political-military basis of their plot to overthrow us and as a military staging area for large-scale wars of aggression when they have conditions for annexing us.

But the ethnic minority groups in Military Region 1, like the ethnic minority people all over Vietnam, have a strong patriotic spirit, and are always united in opposing foreign and domestic enemies and in working to develop the nation. At all times when the destiny of the nation has been threatened, whether by the feudal aggressors from the north in ancient times, by the Japanese fascists and French colonialists in the recent past, or the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists today, the ethnic minority people in the northern border region have arisen as one and united with the ethnic groups in Vietnam's ethnic community to form a solid bloc in order to fight the enemy, save the nation and the family, and defend the frontiers of the homeland. The tradition of patriotism, revolution, and ethnic cohesion of the ethnic minority people in the north, after they were led by the Vietnam Communist Party, has undergone a qualitative change and has a new basis. Military Region 1 was the first revolutionary base area and liberated area of the August Revolution period. It was the location of the headquarters organ during the sacred resistance war against the French colonialists and was the rear area of the great rear area of the north in the historic anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation. In warfare to defend the homeland against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, Military Region 1 is worthy of being the front line which directly confronts the enemy troops.

Due to conditions regarding terrain, tribal relations, economics, society, etc., the ethnic minority people in the northern border area realize more clearly than anyone what it means to live the miserable, threatened life of the ethnic minority people on the other side of the border, under the ruling joke of rulers who are followers of "great Han" hegemonism.

Having had to cope directly with the dirty war of aggression waged by the Chinese reactionaries in February 1979, the ethnic minority people and troops along the northern border are even more capable of understanding the reactionary nature and barbarous crimes of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and their so-called "liberation army." The ethnic minority people came to realize even more clearly the treason, plotting, and crimes of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in league with the U.S. imperialists, sharpened their fighting will and spirit of revolutionary vigilance and, along with the people of the entire nation, defeated their war of destruction.

The soldiers and people in Military Region 1 understand that the enemy are attacking in ways to weaken, overthrow, and annex us. We must develop strongly in all respects and under all circumstances. Successful development is the most certain way to defeat the enemy. Only with economic and political strength can there be strong national defense and security. Therefore, it is necessary to endeavor to build and develop the economy, be concerned for the lives of the ethnic minority peoples and the troops, and maintain security and social order. It is necessary to closely combine development with protection and the economy with national defense, and create a good, solid transformation economically, politically, socially, and with regard to national defense in each locality and in the area as a whole. That is the best way to take the initiative in attacking the enemy and to create the strongest, most effective resistance not only to smash the enemy's many-sided war of destruction but also to create greater combined strength so that we can be prepared to defeat their large scale war of destruction.

In the present war of destruction, on a national scale the Chinese expansionists, in league with the U.S. imperialists, are attacking us in all spheres: economically, politically, ideologically, culturally, militarily, and diplomatically, especially economically, politically, ideologically, and culturally. In the northern border provinces in general and in Military Region 1 specifically, because the enemy are able to move up close to us they pay all-out attention to sabotaging us militarily and sabotage the combat readiness capability of our troops, especially the units at the front.

There the enemy maintain a tense situation and threaten war in many different forms, such as armed provocations, artillery shelling, and sending commando and reconnaissance groups into our country. They have occupied high points and advantageous positions. They use lackeys to sabotage the rear service bases and depots of our armed forces. They pay high prices or make exchanges in other goods to encourage their lackeys, the bad elements, and greedy people to steal our troops' equipment, weapons, and ammunition. They encourage youths not to fulfill their military obligations. They distort and exaggerate the economic difficulties and problems regarding living conditions in the rear area, and appeal for our troops to desert. They divide the troops from the public security forces, the troops from the ethnic minority people, etc. They hold "open air markets" and "ghost markets" along the border, give out presents, and engage in feverish psywar activities to prevent our troops from realizing who the enemy are, to cause them to relax their vigilance, and to weaken their fighting will.

Using military strategems and attacking us militarily, the enemy hope to force us to concentrate manpower and materiel to oppose them, thus creating obstacles for production, economic construction, and improving our people's living conditions, sabotaging the consolidation of our defensive positon in the northern border provinces and, even more important, support the various kinds of lackeys and reactionaries and encourage them to sabotage us in other ways.

The present and permanent military mission of the soldiers and people of the border area in Military Region 1 is to smash the enemy's land-grabbing plot and

resolutely defend every inch of the homeland's frontier, while also strengthening our forces and consolidating our battlefield position of readiness to defeat the enemy aggressors.

Military activities must be combined closely with fighting the enemy on the economic, political, ideological, cultural, and diplomatic fronts. Fighting the enemy must be combined with defending the people, defending production, and defending the lives of the ethnic minority people.

Faced by the enemy every day, the cadres and enlisted men of the people's armed forces in the Military Region -- the main-force troops, the border defense troops, the local troops, the militia, and the self-defense forces -- never neglect their vigilance for even a minute, continually monitor the schemes of the enemy, and strictly observe the combat readiness systems and rules regarding people, weapons, and technical equipment.

The troops coordinate closely with the public security forces and the armed forces cooperate closely with the security forces and the mass organizations in fighting the enemy, protecting order and security, and tracking down the enemy spies and lackey elements in the locality.

Fighting the encroaching enemy troops must be combined with continually building a strong local people's war battlefield position, especially in the districts, villages, and hamlets along the border. The localities and units must consolidate and complete the battlefield positions and build a solid people's security defense line. Each hamlet, village, state farm, state forest, etc., must combine a production plan with a plan to fight the enemy, with a front and a rear echelon, and with combat forces, forces to serve combat, and forces to protect production, protect the people, and organize evacuation when necessary.

In the border districts the local armed forces fight, maintain combat readiness, and build forces that have sufficient numbers, high quality, and weapons and equipment that are appropriate to the combat requirements of each area. The local armed forces must be strong so that they can serve as the hard core for the ethnic minority groups in fighting the enemy, defending the administration, and defending the hamlets and villages. The militia and self-defense forces must be strong, widely organized, and sufficiently strong to build district military bastions and combat clusters and villages.

Concern for improving the living conditions of the military units at the front, ensuring that the troops are well provided for, and maintaining the number of combat troops are missions of the localities and the nation. Only thereby can the troops' difficulties be reduced and conditions created for those at the border to be less deprived and more content when fulfilling their combat and combat readiness missions.

By sabotaging us politically, ideologically, and culturally the enemy hopes to erode the confidence and paralyze the revolutionary fighting will of our soldiers and people. They aim their attacks at our Party's revolutionary line and attack the highest leadership comrades. They seek all ways to divide

the people from the Party, divide the Vietnamese people from the ethnic minority people, divide the ethnic minority groups from one another, and divide the people from the army.

In Military Region 1 the enemy take advantage of the tribal and clan relations of the ethnic minority people on both sides of the border, endeavor to confuse friend with enemy in order to distort the ethnic policy of our Party and state, and work to create dividion among the ethnic minority groups. They take advantage of all of our deficiencies in the economic, cultural, living and social spheres in order to spread propaganda, distort the stands and policies of our Party and state, and foster division and ethnic enmity. They take advantage of such familiar practices as writing letters and sending presents to individuals and families, appealing to ethnic sentiment, bribing and seducing weak people, and winning over bad elements and corrupt cadres and party members who are members of ethnic minority groups to serve as their lackeys. They even send letters and gifts to prestigious people and staunch, exemplary cadres and party members whom they do not know in hopes of "tainting" them and creating suspicion of those cadres. They carry out a "divide and conquer" policy to neutralize individuals, which leads to the neutralization of groups. Furthermore, they feverishly try to win over the reactionaries among the ethnic minority people, bring together reactionaries in exile, and build reactionary political and armed forces. They have stepped up their espionage warfare activities and sent commandoes and spies into our territory to establish contacts, set up reactionary infrastructures, and work to bring about disturbance and rebellion in the hamlets and ethnic minority groups.

They exploit difficulties and deficiencies in economic life, and the negative phenomena among our people and troops. They have set up "open air markets" and stores along the border and dispensed goods and money to win over ethnic minority people who lack political awareness, especially youths and even some enlisted men and cadres in the local armed forces. By that means they gather information, investigate the situation, establish contacts, and seduce and coerce people politically.

The enemy's schemes are extremely insidious, so fighting the enemy on the political, ideological, and cultural front is no less fierce and complicated. An especially important matter is to increasingly consolidate the battlefield position of socialist ideology among the soldiers and people of the border area, accompanied by active opposition to the enemy's ideological sabotage activities and psychological warfare activities. The cadres and men of the armed forces in the Military Region must be enabled to clearly understand the reactionary nature and deceitful schemes of the enemy, and on that basis to distinguish clearly between friend and foe, heighten their revolutionary vigilance, and build solid combat skills. The political-ideological work must especially pay attention to enabling everyone to fully understand, have confidence in, and have a high degree of unanimity toward the lines, stands, and policies of the army and the missions of the soldiers and people in the Military Region.

As regards the cadres and enlisted men, it is necessary to enable them to grasp the Party's ethnic policy so that they can strictly implement it and in

a good job of proselytizing among the ethnic minority groups, fulfill the requirement of the troops and the people sharing a common will, and strengthen the military-civilian solidarity bloc.

It is necessary to continually manifest the implementation of the ethnic policy regarding the cadres and enlisted men in the armed forces by maintaining strict discipline, respecting the state laws and regulations of the local administration, protecting the lives and property of the people, show all-out respect for the customs and habits of the people, be worthy of being "troops of Uncle Ho," and gain the confidence, respect, and love of the people.

If that is to be accomplished the cadres and men of the armed forces in the Military Region must regard the implementation of the ethnic policy as an especially important content of the party-political work. It is necessary to build pure, strong basic-level party organizations and build basic-level units that are comprehensively strong, with regard to will, ability, and discipline.

The troops must take the initiative in coordinating with the local administrations, people, and mass organizations to promptly and satisfactorily end violations of discipline and not allow the enemy to take advantage of them to create divisions between the troops and the people.

The enemy concentrate on sabotaging us economically, especially on sabotaging the material-technical bases of socialism, and of national defense, in order to hold back and sabotage socialist construction and the enterprise of defending the homeland, in hopes of causing the lives of our people to encounter many additional difficulties and political security and social order to become disorderly, and thereby incite political opposition. Economic sabotage is also sabotage of our national defense potential and of our armed forces' rear services support.

In the war of aggression in February 1979, in addition to very barbarously killing our people they carried out a plot to "wipe out" all of our economic accomplishments in the border area. They used explosives to sabotage many production bases and enterprises, took away much machinery and technical equipment, etc. They destroyed crops, stole grain, killed water buffaloes and cattle, poisoned drinking water, etc., which brought about serious consequenes for our people.

Today they are going all-out to take advantage of and exacerbate the difficulties in our economy and living conditions, especially the deficiencies and shortcomings regarding economic construction and the organization of living conditions in the mountain region, in order to incite dissatisfaction among the ethnic minority people. In Military Region 1 the enemy have both intensified their encroachment activities and shelling, maintain a situation of military tension, and spread war propaganda and threaten war, in order to prevent our people along the border from producing in peace.

The enemy send their lackeys to penetrate deeply into our interior, infiltrate our economic bases, burn our warehouses and rear service bases, and start forest fires. They send commandos and spies to infiltrate the hamlets and villages to steal water buffaloes and production equipment, sabotage technical installations serving production such as water conservancy installations, dikes and dams, bridges, etc.

They pay very high prices or exchange thermos bottles, blanket cloth, flashlights, etc., for such goods as fresh watercress greens, anise roots, water buffalo toenails, dried "buffalo eyes" plants, etc., in order to encourage greedy people to sabotage production. They also buy or barter grenades, mines, explosives, etc., to sabotage our troops' fighting strength.

Struggling against the enemy's economic sabotage, defending production, socialist property, and national defense potential, and stabilizing the people's living conditions is an important, urgent mission and a fierce, decisive, complicated struggle.

The strength of national defense and security is based on political and economic strength. Therefore, the construction of a strong economy and concern for the ethnic minority group people is an important, positive aspect of opposition to the war of destruction waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

At present, in the common state of the nation, the economy and life of the ethnic minority people in Military Region 1 are still encountering many difficulties and deficiencies. The enemy's cutting off of the traditional economic relations among the ethnic minority groups on both sides of the border and their economic sabotage have increased the difficulties in our people's lives. They have taken advantage of those difficulties and deprivations, used goods to bribe and seduce, etc., in hopes of creating disorder with regard to politics and social order and safety. Therefore, concern for the people's living conditions, building a strong local economy, and stabilizing and gradually improving the living conditions of the people and the troops, has become even more urgent, has profound political significance, and is the indispensable basis for defeating the enemy's war of destruction.

In showing concern for the living conditions and economy of the ethnic minority people in the Military Region at present, it is first of all necessary to meet the minimum needs of life and production now being posed by the actual situation. It is necessary to be concerned with both major and minor tasks, from primitive labor implements to local small machinery centers, and from kilos of salt, meters of cloth, and medicine pills to travel facilities, small water conservancy projects, mountain roads, medical clinics, schools, etc.

If that is to be accomplished, it is necessary to suitably combine concern by the state organs with efforts by the localities. The most important matter as far as each locality is concerned is to know how to, on the basis of its strengths, find a practical, solid path of advance for the local economy, mobilize the broad masses to participate in production labor, effectively apply scientific-technical accomplishments, and gradually met the essential needs of production and the people's lives. The state organs must go all-out to assist the mountain region districts with regard to both economics and national defense, and create the necessary material conditions for helping the districts to both have a forestry-agricultural-industrial economic structure and be a military fortress,an independent combat organization.

Those are extremely important tasks that are intended to increase the strength of each locality in order to defeat the war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

Helping the ethnic minority people to stabilize and develop production is the responsibility not only of the state organs but also of the armed forces units fulfilling the mission of defending the homeland in the Military Region. Positively participating in production labor, contributing to maintaining living standards, and reducing the localities' difficulties are very important but are insufficient. Furthermore, it is necessary to seek all ways to help the ethnic groups increase production and stabilize living conditions.

Along with the local administrations, the armed units in the Military Region must positively encourage and assist the ethnic minority people to adopt fixed cultivation and habitation, and send cadres and men who have technical training, production experience, and specialized experience in certain sectors and train to guide the people in applying science and technology to the intensive cultivation of crops, animal husbandry, the development of handicrafts, the production of construction materials, the construction of houses, and ensuring technical standards.

A strong local economy, the development of production, and the stabilizing and improving of the living conditions of the people will create favorable conditions for the people and the troops to stand firmly in their area, to build strongpoint villages, defeat the enemy's war of destruction in the locality, and gather strength with which to maintain combat readiness, win victory should a large-scale war break out, and strongly defend the homeland's frontiers.

In order to defeat the enemy's many-sided war of destruction it is necessary to bring into play the strength of all forces -- of the entire party, the entire population, and the entire army -- in order to create great combined strength with which to defeat the enemy in all spheres and in all aspects of social activity.

In order to be accomplished, a basic factor in ensuring victory is that all activities of the organizations, sectors, and mass associations in the local spheres must be placed under the centralized, unified, all-round leadership of the party committee echelons, in accordance with unified guidance, a specific division of labor, and harmonious, tightly coordinated activities, centered around the public security organs. Only if it is placed under the centralized, unified, all-round leadership of the village, district, andprovincial party committees can the collective mastership right of the ethnic minority group people in the Military Region be brought into play and transformed into strength with which to fight the enemy. The experiences of many localities in the Military Region in opposing the war of destruction have shown that in places where leadership is strong, the public security forces cooperate closely with the troops, the security forces coordinate closely with the armed forces, the ethnic minority people are motivated and tightly organized, and the anti-war of destruction apparatus operates according to plan and is closely guided, the locality is sufficiently strong to defeat the enemy in all regards.

Under the centralized, unified leadership of the party committees in the Military Region the local armed forces units, the border defense troops, and the on-the-spot armed forces must strenthen their sense of responsibility, exercise their functions, and take the initiative in coordinating with the

forces, mass organizations, and sectors in fighting the enemy, maintaining order and security, defending the people, and developing the locality. Cooperation and coordination in plans to oppose the war of destruction as well as in the combat readiness and combat plans must be extremely clear and specific, and there must be continuous practice in order to gain experience and supplement the plan. In each locality there must be a division of labor for each objective, key point, and important position, among the forces and units. Contingencies must be forseen so that steps can be taken to deal with them.

The unified military command organs in the localities must do a good job of fulfilling their function of serving as an effective staff organ for the party committee echelons in grasping the enemy, monitoring the situation, and helping the party committee echelons to draft plans to fight the enemy, and of serving as the focal point in coordinating the forces and the spheres of struggle in the area.

The unified military command organs must especially pay attention to organizing coordinated activities between the local armed forces and the on-the-spot armed forces, and between the people's armed forces and the people's public security forces, so that they can serve as forces which effectively serve the masses and the local administration in fighting the enemy and in construction.

The fight against the many-sided war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in Military Region 1 is still a fierce, complicated, long-range fight.

With a glorious revolutionary tradition, knowing how to combine development with combat, paying attention to the centralized, unified, all-round leadership of the party committee echelons, and with the assistance of the entire nation and the entire army, the soldiers and people of Military Region 1 are certain to defeat all plots and schemes of the enemy in the Military Region and contribute to, along with the entire nation, defeating the enemy's many-sided war of aggression, defending the frontiers of the homeland, maintaining our national sovereignty, and building a Military Region that is stable politically, strong with regard to national defense, and rich economically, and which continually makes cultural and scientific-technical progress.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ROLE OF MAIN-FORCE TROOPS IN DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 83 pp 60-65

[Article by Senior Colonel Trinh Hong Thai: "The Mission of Main-Force Troops In Developing District Military Bastions"]

[Text] The Tien Yen regiment fulfills combat missions in district B. Its principal missions are combat readiness and combat and contributing to, along with the local soldiers and people, defending the locality and the frontiers of the homeland. In addition to education and training to increase fighting strength and develop the unit in all regards, the Youth Union has positively participated in creating a battlefield position to master the locality, build socialism in the area where the troops are stationed, and build district military bastions.

The cadres and enlisted men in the regiment clearly realize that the fighting strength of the unit is now much greater than in past years and that that strength cannot be separated from the strength of the locality in which the troops are strengthened. The experiences of many years of fighting the French and the U.S. prove that only if the locality is strong the main-force troops can the main-force troops operating in that area have many additional favorable conditions for fighting and winning victory.

On the basis of fully understanding the two strategic missions, the military missions and line of the Party, the mode of waging people's war to defend the homeland, and the significance, importance, and contents of developing the districts in general and developing district military bastions specifically, the Tien Yen regiment has confirmed its responsibility of taking the initiative and positively participating in building the locality so that it is strong in all regards, and regards that as one of its political missions. Furthermore, that is one of the major contents of the campaign to "develop the fine nature and increasing the fighting strength" of our people's armed forces. During the recent period the regiment has performed a number of tasks which have been highly evaluated by the local party organization, administration, and people.

1. Contribute to build a politically strong locality.

In fulfilling its combat and combat readiness in the border districts and directly confronting the enemy every day, one of the regiment's important

missions is to grasp our situation and that of the enemy and grasp all capabilities of the locality, especially the political-social situation. It has coordinated with local party committees and administrations in analyzing and evaluating the local political-social situation, forecasting potential developments and assigning specific areas and missions to the basic-level units so that they can clearly understand the situation in and manage the areas assigned them. The regiment has taken the initiative in participating in many local activities. For example, after the district party committee and administration adopted the policy of relocating a number of population centers the troops worked with the localities in explaining the policy and guiding and helping the families affected by the move, and created the most favorable conditions so that they could be at ease and continue to produce and live in the new locations. The regiment organized military-civilian brotherhood relations. The civilian proselyting work teams organized by the regiment cooperated with the local administrations and mass organizations in propagandizing the lines and policies of the Party, exposed the enemy's sabotage plots toward the locality and the nation, opposed the enemy's psychological warfare, and encouraged the people to participate in building the armed forces and in maintaining political security and social safety in the locality. Many units in the regiment clearly understand the situation of each family, hamlet, and village and assist the people in their production and life. Therefore, the ethnic minority people in that area have increasingly greater confidence in and love for the troops, and actively assist them and cooperate with them so that they can fulfill their mission of defending the border and the locality. The local cadres, especially the heads of sections and the cooperative cadres continually exchange opinions with the cadres managing troops, so that they could work together in promptly analyzing and resolving problems that occur. In the key areas, the regiment has also formed work teams to work with the local administrations in building up the basic-level village and cooperative units. It may be that that at present the units and localities are capable of managing their areas and clearly understand the basic manner, enable good people can become core cadres, categorize people who require monitoring, and promptly become aware of strange people who arrive in the localities.

The regiment has cooperated with the echelons and sectors in the district in drafting plans for each period of time and in each area. At the same time, there is a schedule of activities between the units and localities in order to grasp the over-all situation.

In order to participate in maintaining political security and social safety in the locality. The regiment has organized military control units in many forms to coordinate with the local public security police and district control forces and has uncovered dozens of instances of violations of laws and the theft of public property, confiscated much valuable property for the state and the local people, captured a gang that specialized in seducing people into illegally immigrating, and promptly and effectively arrested enemy spies and scoundrels who had just infiltrated the locality.

The regiment fulfills its mission in a border area which has many ethnic components and in which the relations between the people on both sides of the border are of long standing and are thus rather complicated. Furthermore, the enemy on the other side of the border every day and every hour comes up with many sabotage plots and schemes.

They broadcast propaganda programs which distort our lines and policies in order to incite the masses, creating division between the soldiers and people and among the ethnic groups, and weakening the fighting will of our people and soldiers. To respond to them, the regiment set up clusters of large signs in Chinese along the border and set up groups of loudspeakers on a number of high points along the border in order to enable the Chinese people in the border area to clearly understand the justness of the struggle of the Vietnamese people against the expansionists and hegenonists, and our good will, and to expose the reactionary plots of the Beijing rulers.

By means of specific deeds the regiment has worked with the local soldiers and people in more tightly controlling the key points along the border. That also proves that the regiment's proselyting activities with regard to the ethnic minority people in the border area have achieved good results and have gained the confidence, suport, and assistance of the local people. It may be said that at present anyone who goes to district B to work can hear the praise of the local people for the cadres and men of the Tien Yen regiment.

The political security and social order and safety situation in district B has improved clearly in comparison to the past. When strangers arrive they are kept under surveillance by the military control forces,public security polices, and local militia and self-defense forces, and everything is meticulously guided. The Tien Yen regiment is now working with the local administrative organs to divide up management among the combat clusters, and is cooperating in educating and organizing the people to gradually enable everyone there to become security warriors who defend the locality and the frontiers of the homeland. The Tien Yen regiment has many times been awarded certificates of commendation by the Ministry of Interior and awarded prizes for its accomplishments in participating in the management of border security.

2. Positively contribute to creating a position of local mastery and building large and strong local armed forces.

Fully understanding the military line of the Party and the role of the district in the consolidation of national defense and people's war to defend the homeland, the Tien Yen regiment has taken the initiative in meeting with the localities to reach agreement about the district's combat role and missions, combat readiness, and plans for combat coordination between the main-force troops and the local armed forces and people in the district.

The creation of battlefield positions based on combat villages and hamlets and integrated combat clusters, and on the gradual reorganization of production and the economic-social development of the district,in a manner appropriate to the roles, characteristics, and combat missions of the districts, especially the border districts on the homeland's front line. That battlefield position is being created so that we can have sufficient strength to defeat the enemy's many-sided war of destruction in the locality, while at the same time being prepared to cope victoriously with their large-scale war of aggression.

The villages and cities in the district, which include many population points, have militia and self-defense forces numbering thousands of people and are organized into basic combat clusters. Those combat clusters create a common

battlefield position for the district and are combined with the tactical deployments of the main-force units. When building the district's battlefield position the regiment discussed many plans with the locality, with which it worked to derive at the most rational plan and the most positive measures to ensure the fulfillment of the requirements of knowing when the enemy arrive, annihilating them when they arrive, and fighting the enemy with combined strength; creating a strong, integrated position with on-the-spot forces and mobile forces, with a firepower system, a system of natural and man-made obstaces, and reserves of food and ammunition. That is a battlefield position of local people's war to resolutely achieve mastery, annihilate the enemy troops, and solidly defend the locality.

In addition to contributing to building the district battlefield position. The Tien Yen regiment has adopted the policy of building camps for the troops on the model of a combat village or hamlet, in accordance with the determined combat formation. The camps of the detachments are closely tied in with the populated villages and hamlets in the integrated combat clusters. All of them are built with the intention of attaining the highest level of combat readiness, according to the combat plans that have been drafted.

The Tien Yen regiment sent many groups of cadres and worked with the local party committee and administration in developing and training increasingly larger and stronger local armed forces. It may be said that the main-force troops and the local forces there (local troops, militia, and self-defense forces) coordinate closely in combat, are united, and work together in building and defending the frontiers of the homeland and the locality. The main-force troops, militia, and self-defense forces have organized many combined combat maneuversin the integrated combat villages and clusters, in accordance with a training plan and a combat plan. By that means the regiment has helped the local troops, militia, and self-defense forces improve their organization and command and their ability to apply fighting methods, and fulfill the combat and combat readiness plans to defend the locality. The soldiers and people in the district have organized "military-civilian" solidarity festival days to develop the vital combat solidarity of the soldiers and people in the mission of building and defending the socialist homeland.

3. Participating in economic and cultural development in the locality, directly contributing to building rich and strong localities and to creating on-the-spot sources of rear services for combat.

One of the major problems posed for the front-line border provinces in to develop circulation in the district, between the districts and the surrounding localities, and with the province and the rear echelon. Therefore, the regiment has, along with the localities, urgently built additional road networks and improved the surfaces of the existing roads. Since 1979 the regiment has built many additional new roads with a total length of more than 163 kilometers, repaired dozens of bridges, and upgraded the surfaces on 600 kilometers of roads. Those roads meet the requirements of both national defense and economic-cultural development by the people in the district. The new roads have contributed to changing the local economic situation, while at the same time creating additional favorable conditions so that the units can

consolidate their combat positions and improve the living conditions of the cadres and men at the strong points and on the high points in the border region.

In addition to building additional roads the regiment launched an "orchard and fish pond" movement to which the localities and units have responded strongly. In the "orchard and fish pond" movement the regiment has planted more than 5 million fruit trees of the various kinds, including more than 20,000 jackfruit trees, 6,000 litchi trees, thousands of persimmon, jujube and plum trees, tens of thousands of pineapples, etc. By that means the regiment worked with the localities in providing the district with many types of year-round fruit trees and transformed denuded hillsides into green orchards. That movement has had an effect in many ways. Even in areas more than 1,000 meters above sea level in mountain range C there are fish ponds. The units' water buffaloes, cattle, and hogs have developed strongly. The regiment raised more than 1,000 water buffaloes, more than 60,000 chickens, and more than 2,000 hogs. Last year the regiment harvested more than 189 tons of grain of all kinds.

The regiment has coordinated with the locality in bringing into play the strengths of the mountain region by growing such industrial crops for export as cinnamon and anise. The units planted 60,000 cinnamon trees and 600,000 pine, Cunninghamia Lanceolata, and sandalwood trees. Furthermore, it planted more than 40,000 rattan plants to create border fences in the necessary areas.

In addition to growing crops and raising livestock to improve the troops living conditions and create reserve stocks for combat, the regiment has been concerned with building houses and athletic fields to create an ordinary life in remote border areas, even at the front-line strongpoints.

With the concern of the upper echelon and the assistance of the locality, the cadres and men in the regiment built for themselves 4,242 square meters of Class-4 housing, including more than 3,000 square meters of tile-roofed houses and 576 square meters of flat-roofed housing. At present, 100 percent of the regiment's cadres and enlisted men have beds. The cadres at all levels have desks and filling cabinets, the detachments have gun racks and rice bins, etc.

The regiment has worked with the localities to build more than 30 school rooms which are fully equipped with desks, chairs, and blackboards, and housing for teachers. The families of disabled veterans and war dead, and those which have merit toward the revolution in the localities, have been helped by the detachments in cooperation with the localities, from repairing their houses to helping them in productio and when they encounter difficulties. On the major holidays the regiment works with the localities in organizing such "military-civilian brotherhood" projects as building hydroelectricity projects, digging irrigation ditches, and building roads.

Those specific deeds have contributed to building a position of mastery even in the hearts of the ethnic minority people in the border region. During the

past several years district B has developed in many ways in comparison to the past. Many old men of the Dao ethnic minority group say that "thanks to the Party and the troops of Uncle Ho, our villages have improved." That also demonstrates the revolutionary nature of the army and the superiority of the socialist system. Those practical deeds have had an important effect in creating a favorable combat position for the regiment and for teaching and educating the people to build and defend the border and defend the homeland.

During future years the Tien Yen regiment and the locality will continue to improve the existing road network, especially the important roads in the district, in order to both serve economic development and meet the needs of consolidating national defense. The regiment will concentrate its forces on building a number of hydroelectric stations so that area C can soon have electricity, so that the "troop villages" can have electric lights, and to meet the needs of the life and work of the troops in the homeland's border area.

The regiment is going all-out to build water reservoirs and build a water conservancy system to irrigate 120 to 150 hectares of two-crop rice land which will at the same time serve as a large fish pond for the units. The units are working with the people in the district to build a cultural center, a swimming pool, and athletic filed, a hospital, a daycare center, and a centralized commercial zone. Bringing into play the strengths and favorable conditions of the locality, the regiment is also organizing a stock-raising area and a large-scale construction materials production area. That stock-raising area can now raise between 800 and 1,000 water buffaloes, cattle, and goats, including those raised for milk, and can be developed to 2,000 animals. The regiment has a fish hatchery and a base for raising bees to produce honey, which both meet the unit's need to develop production and partly meets the need to develop animal husbandry in the locality. The regiment's construction materials production area now has a brick plant with a capacity of 1 million bricks a year and a tile plant with a capacity of 50,000 bricks a year. The regiment has worked with the local party committee and administration to draft plans so that the people in the district can in the near future catch up with, and in many ways surpass, the people in the lowlands.

Although they are still encountering many difficulties in their lives, in comparison to previous years the living conditions of the soldiers and people in the district have clearly improved in many regards. The local party committee, administration, and people highly value the positive contributions of the cadres and men of the Tien Yen regiment toward building and defending the locality and defending the frontiers of the homeland. Furthermore, in participating in building the locality and building district military bastions the cadres and men of the regiment have clearly matured in many regards.

Turning border districts into military bastions is a major, difficult mission which includes many spheres and tasks. It demands concern on the part of the echelons and sectors from the central echelon down to the local echelon. The main-force troops stationed in the locality play a very important role in fulfilling that mission. It is a very practical mission and has a direct effect in increasing the unit's capability and fighting strength. Although it still has weaknesses and has not yet met the requirements, the Tien Yen

regiment has gone all-out to manifest a positive spirit, dares to think and do, do, and coordinates closely with the soldiers and people in the district in building and defending the locality, from policies and plans to the specific steps. The regiment has developed a spirit of close solidarity between the soldiers and people, especially in the leadership and command echelons of the troops and the locality. By means of practical acts the cadres and men of the Tien Yen regiment have endeavored to manifest revolutionary qualities and the fine traditions of the heroic Vietnam People's Army, and to create confidence in and love of the unit among the masses. The regiment pays attention to making the unit incresingly stronger in all respects, so that it can be a reliable hard core in the local combat and combat readiness missions.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPROVEMENT OF BASIC-LEVEL DETACHMENTS URGED

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[Article by Major General Nguyen The Bon: "Improve the Quality of Training of Basic-Level Detachments"]

[Text] The basic-level detachment is a combined structural-organizational cell of our army which directly trains the outstanding cadres and enlisted men and creates a collective which is united in will and action, has determination, and has strong combat skills in order to victoriously fulfill all missions. Only if the basic-level detachments are strong can there be strong company grade units and field grade units. Some people compare the basic-level detachments to bricks in the wall of a citadel. Only if the bricks are good can the wall be strong. On the contrary, no matter how grand, imposing, and attractive a building is, if its bricks are not good and its walls and foundation are not solid, the building can hardly endure. Not only at present but also in the future, no matter how large the scale of modern combat the basic-level detachments will continue to occupy an extremely important position in our army's development and combat. The cadres and men in the basic-level detachments are the first people who directly annihilate the enemy and are the people who take and control the final positions. Therefore, paying adequate attention to building basic-level detachments and improving the quality of training of the basic-level units are always urgent requirements of our army's combat training mission.

During the past several years many basic-level detachments at the front and in the rear, along the northern border, and at the border defense posts, and the units on distant islands and on battlefields in which our army is fulfilling Its international missions, have made all-out efforts to overcome difficulties and closely combine training with combat and combat readiness, and have achieved many accomplishments. Nearly all of the detachments, company grade units, and field grade units, up to the military regions, corps, armed forces branches, combat arms, etc., have been trained in teaching model subjects and in training cadres and enlisted men to change over to a combat-ready status. In maneuvers, attention has been paid to practice in sounding the alarm to change over to a combat-ready status, according to the contents and actions of the commanders and detachments in all circumstances. Therefore, we have maintained a status of combat readiness and gradually increased the unit's combat strength.

The echelons, from the detachments, company grade units, and field grade units to the military regions, corps, armed forces branches, and combat arms, the General Staff, etc., have drafted combat training plans, in accordance with a unified, professional orientation which is relatively appropriate to the missions and actual conditions of each unit. Therefore, it has been possible to avoid adding to, subtracting from, or changing the plans in the process of fulfilling the training missions.

Although they have to disperse their activities over a large area, both in our country and Laos or Kampuchea, many units, armed forces branches, and combat arms have strictly carried out the training orders and directives of the Ministry; fulfilled their training missions in accordance with the stipulated times, contents, and programs; and begun to pay attention to improving training organization and methods and gradually put training on a professional basis, so the quality of training of quality improved notably.

In the training of cadres, attention has been paid to regularizing the training of command and command organ cadres at the various echelons. Therefore, the ability of detachment, company grade unit, and field grade unit cadres to grasp the principles of tactics, campaigns, and the organization and command of combined arms combat has improved.

Education in carrying out orders and observing discipline has included positive activities and attention has been paid to the specific organization and implementation measures in order to manage and discipline troops. Cadres at all echelons have been concerned with doing a better job of organizing the living conditions of cadres and enlisted men. Many previously deficient detachments and individuals have become "advanced," "good," or "skilled" models.

However, in comparison to the requirements of the present combat training mission, the quality of training at the basic-level detachment level is still beset with limitations and deficiencies. The principal reasons for the deficiencies are that the commanders and the command-guidance organs at all levels have not actively overcome difficulties in order to strictly carry out the combat training orders and directives of the Ministry of National Defense, and there has been a failure to regard training as a central concern so that the other tasks can be rationally arranged. The commanders and command organs at all levels have personally guided training by drafting plans and guiding the lower echelon in drafting training plans, and have seldom overseen the implementation of training plans, regulations, and rules by the lower echelon in order to improve the quality of training.

We must resolutely overcome those deficiencies, while at the same time improving training organization and methods in order to create a new transformation in the fulfillment of the training mission at the basic-level detachment level. Those are not only urgent requirements of the present combat training mission but are also one of the long-range struggle goals in raising the people's army to an increasingly professional, modern level. In the immediate future

it is necessary to grasp the training and combat missions of the basic-level detachments and it is necessary to apply practical, effective measures.

1. The basic-level detachments must be trained fundamentally, systematically, and in a unified, comprehensive, and solid manner.

In coping with that problem, some cadres think that "there's nothing new." Its true that "there's nothing new"! But the problem must be posed, for it has not yet been well resolved. In fact, during the past several training years many cadres have failed to grasp the contents, slogans, and methods of training detachments, which has adversely affected the quality of basic-level detachment training.

F. Engels, a great military thinker of the proletarian class said that soldiers determine victory on the battlefield. If the soldiers are not carefully educated and trained in order to have a high level of political consciousness and strong fighting will, have basic, solid technical and tactical knowledge, have consciousness of organization and strict discipline, or become soldiers with solid combat skills who know how to act correctly, flexibly, and creatively under all circumstances, how can the detachments, company grade units, and field grade units be sufficiently strong to victoriously fulfill all missions that are assigned? Thus even in the training of basic-level detachments our army's basic training requirements, such as a party nature, scientific nature, and practical nature, must be met strictly and specifically.

Basic, systematic, and solid training must first of all be carried out in the process of technical training. The technical enlisted men and personnel must, by the use of weapons and technical facilities, fulfill their combat and specialized missions. If they do not make good use of weapons and facilities to annihilate the enemy and fulfill their specialized missions, they frankly are not qualified to be soldiers. We often say that our cadres and men are patriotic, are brave in combat, and act resourcefully and bravely, but if they are not well trained in the use of weapons and facilities those noble qualities cannot be brought into play. Furthermoere, under the conditions of our army having been and now being equipped with increasingly modern equipment, the basic, systematic, and solid technical training of cadres and enlisted men is a very urgent objective requirement.

Each person (depending on his authority and responsibility in combat) must be trained to grasp the technical capabilities, construction, and use of weapons, and the way to use, maintain, store and make ordinary repairs on the various kinds of weapons and technical facilities that are assigned them in order to use them with maximum effectiveness under differing conditions with regard to terrain, weather, fighting methods, etc. The commanders of squads, platoons, gun crews, ship and truck detachments, etc., must be well trained so that they can use the weapons and facilities in the TO & E and can train the enlisted men and command in combat. With regard to the infantry detachments everyone, from the enlisted men to the commanders of squads, platoons, and companies, must be trained and drilled so that they can be expert in daytime and nighttime marksmanship, in accordance with the new marksmanship curriculum.

The artillery [illegible] and the technical combat arms, such as artillery and [illegible], must be trained so that they can attain basic, solid technical and [illegible] levels, especially in accurate and timely firing and launching, [illegible] at positions which have been prepared in advance and when firing at night. [illegible], from company commanders to commanders of artillery clusters, must be trained so that they can be expert in commanding firing and in fulfilling all firing missions in both offensive combat and defensive combat and under complicated circumstances (urgent preparations, bad weather, and mountainous terrain).

With regard to tank, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, specialized towing, and other detachments, they must receive basic, solid, complete training in such subjects as tank commanding, tank driving, gunnery, and repair, in accordance with the basic curricula, so that they can use tanks and artillery in jungle and mountain terrain, move in formation on dirt roads and on hilly roads both day and night, etc.

In technical training it is also necessary to pay attention to all-round training. All cadres and men in the basic-level detachments must be trained so that they can be skilled in using vechicles and machinery and in firing guns and artillery, as well as being expert in such technical subjects as digging fortifications, camouflage, the use of grenades and explosives, and the techniques of overcoming the various kinds of explosive obstacles. At the same time, it is necessary to train them to become expert in maintenance and in strictly observing the storage and maintenance rules and regulations, especially with regard to modern combat equipment with complicated, sophisticated construction, such as electronic and microelectronic equipment, optical equipment, etc.

It is necessary to regard training, and the strict observance of the regulations regarding the good storage and maintenance of weapons and equipment in the [illegible] as also being contents of basic technical training. It is necessary to teach each enlisted man and cadre to understand very clearly that our country is in the tropical region and its terrain, weather, and climate conditions are very severe, and that it is also in the period of transition from small-scale, dispersed, backward production to socialism. We are not yet capable of producing many kinds of valuable and expensive modern weapons and technical equipment, so most of it is provided by the fraternal nations. If the equipment and weapons are not well maintained and used for a long period of time, that will not only waste the money sweat, and tears of the people but prevent us from promptly annihilating the enemy should fighting break out, and at times even force us to pay needlessly with our blood and those of our comrades!

In tactical training, the requirement of truly basic and systematic training is intended to enable every individual, team, squad, platoon, company, and battalion to grasp the principles and tactical operations of their echelon in both tactical operational forms: offense and defense. Each individual must be trained to operate accurately and flexibly according to their missions, and act in harmony with the other people and elements of the formation. It is necessary to train in coordinated combat by infantry, tanks, artillery, and airplanes even at the company and battalion levels in the offensive and defensive combat forms and in the other fighting methods. The detachment commanders

must be trained very tactically and solidly with regard to organizing and carrying out combat at their echelon in both independent combat and coordinated combat, and both daytime and nighttime, in the area in which the unit fulfills combat missions. At the same time it is necessary to pay attention to training in the other combat support topics, such as patrolling, guarding, warning, troop movement, bivouacking, etc.

When training in each topic and subject it is necessary to train in each action fundamentally and accurately, in accordance with a training program for each echelon, from easy to difficult, from simple to complicated, and from individual to combined. In studying any action or training subject it is necessary to master that action or subject. Certain actions and subjects should be studied first to serve as a basis for assimilating the training and topics to follow. When studying the later topics and subjects it is important to review the topics and subjects that have already been studied. After technical training has been concluded the squads and platoons must practice combat firing and companies and battalions must carry out tactical maneuvers.

Basic, all-round training must also be reflected in educating and training the detachments so that it can have organization and discipline. First of all, the cadres and men must be educated and trained so that they can correctly observe discipline in training: discipline in the lecture hall and on the training field, discipline with regard to time, and discipline with regard to clothing and travel. The training process must be a process of educating and forging, and of inspecting the carrying out of orders by each person and detachment. It is necessary to continually strengthen the self-enlightenment of the cadres, enlisted men, and commanders so that they can do a good job of managing, and bring an end to the phenomenon of laissez-faire, arbitrariness, and even a lack of discipline in the training process. Important aspects of discipline, such as discipline in carrying out missions and orders of the upper echelon, discipline in correctly carrying out the combat readiness regulations, discipline in observing the regulations regarding the maintenance of weapons and technical equipment, etc., must be strictly taught and forged by both persuasion and compulsion. The fighting strength of detachments, and close coordination among the elements and men in them, must be built and developed on the basis of each enlisted man and cadre voluntarily carrying out their functions and missions, and on the basis of strong organization and discipline on the part of all military personnel. Therefore, the process of teaching and forging discipline is a process of command cadres forging themselves and strictly and persistently persuade and manage enlisted men, without becoming lax or formalistic. Because of both love and responsibility, the commander must forge strict discipline in the detachment. To love the enlisted men is to enable them to become soldiers with discipline and solid combat skills, and that is also the principal responsibility of commanders in educating and managing the unit.

It must be remembered that basic training never contradicts the combat readiness mission. Only if there is very good basic training can we raise the level of combat readiness and increase fighting strength. Of course, basic training must always be based on the requirements of combat and the troops combat readiness mission. The actual situation has shown that units which pay

adequate attention to training and receive good basic training have a high level of combat readiness and good combat quality. Units which receive poor-quality training and do a poor job of enforcing discipline also have deficient combat strength and effectiveness. Some people think that any training will be because the time test comes when the enemy are directly confronted in the battlefield. That is only a superficial excuse. President Ho taught us that "In order to become a good commander a cadre must first of all be skilled in taking care of and training troops."

- Attention must be paid to training a corps of basic-level detachment command cadres.

The basic-level detachment commanders are people who directly teach theory and principles, conduct model demonstrations, guide and apply training methods for the detachment, and promptly resolve the problems and correct the deficiencies in the lower echelons; the enlisted men in the training and forging process. As Uncle Ho said that "Units reflect their cadres." That means that if cadres are well trained, have basic knowledge, grasp the principles, are good at organizing and carrying out training, have good virtue, have exemplary work styles, etc., it is certain that the quality of the detachment's training will be high. If not, the reverse will be true. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of training of basic-level detachments it is necessary to pay adequate attention to training the basic-level detachment cadres.

Realizing its importance, during the past several years the military region, army, armed forces branch, and technical and specialized combat arm echelons have held many short-term training classes for the detachment cadres at the various levels and attained certain results. But in comparison to the requirements of the present combat training mission the corps of basic-level detachment cadres is still lacking in numbers and weak with regard to quality. There are many reasons for that situation: some aspects of our basic and advanced training are not yet good and some aspects are affected by the difficult, complicated circumstances in social life.

There is a actual difficulty which we realize has existed during the training period, but which is difficult to avoid: the corps of detachment cadres especially the squad leaders, gun crew commanders, etc., and some platoon cadres frequently undergoes changes. Every year, in the carrying out of the military obligation law a large number of squad leaders andplatoon cadres who have had combat training and experience are discharged or are selected to study other sectors or trades.

Furthermore, nearly all of the basic-level detachment cadres receive very little basic education in the system of regular schools and classes. That has also limited to a certain degree the quality of the detachments' combat training. In order to continually have a corps of basic-level detachment cadres (especially noncommissioned officers) that is sufficiently adequate with regard to both quantity and quality to meet all requirements of the army's combat training mission, we must positively employ many sources and forms, and many practical, effectively measures. Efforts must be made to, within the briefest possible period, plan the training of basic-level detachment cadres (noncommissioned officers) in accordance with a basic, professional system. In the immediate future, it is necessary to select new recruits (who have completed

[illegible] training with sufficient political-ideological, cultural, and physical qualifications to study in noncommissioned officer training schools. These [illegible] must be trained so that they can become professional noncommissioned officers who have both sufficient revolutionary qualities and ability to command and train the squad, gun crew, and platoon echelons. They are also rich sources of supplementation for the long-range training of officers and reserve officers.

In addition to basic training in a system of professional schools, it is necessary to pay adequate attention to planned, continuous on-the-job training that is appropriate to each category, with a division of labor and responsibility among the echelons. In addition to holding regular training classes and [illegible] training, before beginning each phase, training month, or training week, and even each new training subject and topic, detachment training cadres must be briefed so that they can fully grasp the goals, requirements, contents, training methods of that subject. Briefing regarding the weekly and monthly training contents are usually carried out at the company and battalion levels. When necessary, they can be carried out at the regimental or higher level.

In the training process it is necessary to pay adequate attention to both aspects: the contents of training and training organization and methods. As we all know, the factors which determine the quality of training include not only the training contents but also training organization and methods. If there are good contents but the training methods are not appropriate, are monotonous, lack liveliness, and do not arouse interest among the trainers and students, it is difficult to attain high training quality. Cadres from the squad level to the company level must grasp the principles, be expert demonstrators, and do a good job of applying training methods. The supplementary training of squad leaders, platoon leaders, and company commanders must truly help them improve the level of training and management of detachments in the training process. Therefore, supplementary training must stress actual practice on the training field. Each person trained must truly practice and carry out specific demonstrations, organize training on the drill field and carry out on-the-spot training. Recently, when giving supplementary training to detachment cadres we have not paid adequate attention to applying the methods of "speak little and train much" and "correct mistakes as they occur." The method of interspersed, rotational training is one of the advanced training methods but a number of cadres have not yet truly trained, or have trained too little, so when it trains directly the detachment is still confused.

4. The commanders and command organs at all levels must strictly fulfill their training missions, according to their functions and responsibilities.

One of the important problems, one which determines the quality of detachment training, is that the commanders and command organs at all levels must know how to organize, manage, and implement training plans, according to their responsibility.

First of all, all command cadres must grasp the central [illegible] of maintaining a high degree of combat readiness. Therefore, all commanders and command organs directly guiding detachment training must closely monitor the

[illegible] in each period of time, as well as the training missions. The [illegible] commanders and command organs must go deeply and closely in order [illegible] and cultivate the lower echelon and help it fulfill its mission in [illegible] process. One must not take the view that when the detachment [illegible] upper-level commanders and command organs can "take it easy" only [illegible] have approved the plan! The actual situation has shown that in [illegible] as well as in combat the upper-echelon cadres who take the trouble to [illegible] situation deeply and closely, and who correctly fulfill their [illegible] of "the upper echelon educating the lower echelon," not only serve [illegible] for the lower echelon in the strict fulfillment of responsi-[illegible] but also have a good opportunity to clearly understand the private [illegible] aspirations, and specific difficulties of the lower echelon, and to [illegible] and encourage them to enthusiastically overcome their difficul-[illegible] resolutely fulfill their missions, and are loved and respected by the [illegible] and top-to-bottom solidarity is strengthened. Concern by the [illegible] commanders and command cadres of the lower echelon also has a [illegible] when the detachments are given real help in resolving their pro-[illegible] time, facilities, POL, vehicles, etc. Places which are not [illegible] regard to training contents and are confused with regard to [illegible] training organization and methods should be given prompt on-the-[illegible] by the upper echelon. That is the responsibility of upper-[illegible] commanders and command organs in the process of guiding and commanding [illegible] in fulfilling their training plans.

[illegible] must overcome all difficulties, take the initiative, [illegible] and strictly carry out the training orders and directives of [illegible]. All training orders and directives must be carried out as [illegible] if they were combat orders. The phenomena of liberalism and the [illegible] changing or trimming the training contents, curricula, time, or the [illegible] being trained must be ended. When it is necessary to adjust [illegible] the training contents and programs, the lower-echelon commanders [illegible] must submit recommendations for approval by the relevant [illegible] commander or command organ. They should act only after they have [illegible] approval.

[illegible] being exemplary in fulfilling their responsibility of "the [illegible] training the lower echelon, the upper-echelon commanders and com-[illegible] must continually inspect and evaluate the quality of training in [illegible] a strict, objective, and scientific system. The best method [illegible] carrying out a system of demonstrations, drills, maneuvers, etc., [illegible] evaluate the results of training; promptly gain experience and enable [illegible] experiences regarding the contents and methods of [illegible] instruction and study; and make just criticisms and commendations [illegible] training period. The inspection and evaluation of training quality [illegible] reflect the level of the detachment and be accompanied by [illegible] measures to overcome the weaknesses and develop the good points.

[illegible] level and below, after the completion of each technical and [illegible] subject, tactical maneuver, tactical maneuver using live [illegible], also it is necessary strictly accurately, and specifically evaluate [illegible] training on the basis of the good points, deficiencies, and [illegible]

At the battalion level, the best method is to, after each training month, organize demonstrations, drills, and maneuvers to inspect the results of training. Emphasis should be on accurately evaluating the key subjects and avoid inspections that are wide but not deep and specific, formalistic boasting, or the pursuit of artificial accomplishments which do not truly reflect the results of training.

It must be realized that strict, accurate inspections and evaluations of training quality is one of the important factors in improving the quality of detachment training. They not only serve to directly promote the process of organizing and fulfilling the present training missions but are also useful experiences and lessons for future training years. They require all commanders to have proper motivation and a sense of responsibility, and be aware of voluntarily and strictly carrying them out.

The upper-echelon commanders and command organs must do a good job of fulfilling their mission and responsibility of creating favorable conditions so that the detachments can fulfill their training missions. It is necessary to pay adequate attention to creating the minimum material-technical conditions so that the detachments can fulfill the stipulated training plans. The training materials, paper for preparing lectures, facilities for making firing ranges, sufficient POL so that tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery can train in accordance with the stipulated program, ammunition for marksmanship training, cloths to clean weapons, etc., must be provided in accordance with the training plans. When drafting training plans the commanders and command organs at all levels must make correct, detailed calculations regarding those capabilities in order to transform training plans into reality and contribute to increasing the fighting strength of the basic-level detachments.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPROVEMENT OF REAR SERVICES WORK URGED

[Article TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 83 pp 31-36

[Speech by Lieutenant General Bui Phung, Vice Minister of National Defense, at the 1983 All-Army Rear-Services Conference: "Improve the Effectiveness of the Rear Services Work"]

[Text] Last year, under the conditions of the nation's economy still experiencing many difficulties, the enemy engaging in many kinds of sabotage activities, and the work of ensuring the living standards of the troops being unstable and including many problems related to organization and the mode of ensuring living standards that had not been well resolved, the entire rear services branch made great efforts, united, shared an attitude of service from top to bottom, and achieved many accomplishments. The branch was able to meet main rear services requirements, especially the development of on-the-spot rear services to serve combat and combat readiness on the battlefields, and went all-out to gradually stabilize, and in some cases improve, the troops' living conditions. The increasing of production and the management and exercise of economy throughout the army were maintained and attention was paid to producing grain, processing foodstuffs for the troops' meals, etc. With regard to POL, transportation, materials, military camps, finances, etc., many difficulties were overcome, the immediate needs were met, and quality was improved.

However, in the rear services work there are still many problems which must be resolved in 1983. Although the troops' living conditions have improved they are still poor, especially in the units at the front. The mission of long-range basic development, which includes building a rear services battlefield position in war to defend the homeland, build material-technical bases, draft rules to ensure rear services and the standards and norms regarding the depletion and use of materials and fuel, has not achieved much, is not yet strong, and is not yet truly urgent. The quality of the rear services must be improved in some respects. For example, maintenance, production, and management have not undergone strong transformations. The practicing of economy has not yet become a uniform, broad, and specific movement to transform it into reality.

In order to fully understand and resolutely fulfill the two strategic missions of the Vietnamese revolution set forth by the Fifth Party Congress, we must enable our nation to become stronger economically and with regard to national

defense under all circumstances. Especially, it is necessary to create economic strength, for that is the basis of national defense strength. The economic-social situation has undergone a new, very important transformation which, although it is only the first step, has opened up prospects for resolving the difficulties in order to advance.

Our entire party, army, and population are resolutely defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction. At the same time, it is necessary to be prepared to cope with the contingency of the enemy starting a large-scale war of aggression. It is necessary to continually keep up our revolutionary vigilance, endeavor to consolidate and increase the fighting strength, level of combat readiness, and over-all quality of the people's armed forces, promote the building of a national defense of all the people, and meet the needs of national defense, stoutly defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland, and fulfill its international obligations.

The army's rear services branch must firmly grasp the basic mission of the entire army in order to do a good job of meeting its needs. It is necessary to concentrate the strength of the entire branch, from the central level down to the unit and local levels, in order to fulfill the mission of serving combat and combat readiness, and especially the central mission of the rear services branch: being concerned with the troops' living conditions.

I will stress a number of matters that must be fully understood and grasped in order to organize implementation and increase the effectiveness of the rear services work in 1983.

1. Firmly grasp the basic viewpoints and guidance thoughts of the Party, manifest consciousness of collective mastership and a spirit of self-reliance, and exploit all capabilities of the units and localities in order to balance plans and fulfill all missions under all circumstances.

In the first phase of the period of transition to socialism in our country, the missions of economic-social construction and development and the consolidation of national defense and security are very difficult and urgent. In actuality, under the light of the resolutions of the Party and state, new transformations and elements have blossomed and developed in all spheres of activity with a new tempo. However, there are still many difficulties, which affect and directly severe the rear services work in the army. For that reason, every rear-services cadre, worker, civil servant, and enlisted man must not only manifest consciousness of collective mastership, a revolutionary offensive will, and a spirit of self-reliance. They must also resolutely struggle to overcome pessimistic, negative, indifferent thoughts in order to fulfill all missions under all circumstances. We must also overcome difficulties and take the initiative in coordinating with the sectors and echelons of the state organs from the central echelon to the localities and bases, in order to fully utilize all sources of supply -- from the upper echelon, on-the-spot requisition purchases, and self-production -- so that they can have plans to balance their needs. It is necessary to do a good job of resolving several problems: organizing good supply, increasing production, strengthening material-technical guidance, practicing economy, opposing corruption and waste and, finally, positively building a strong, comprehensive, pure rear services

sector, and unite from top to bottom in dedication to service and in attaining high effectiveness and quality.

2. Grasp the central rear services task of promptly and fully supporting the combat and combat readiness missions and the troops' living conditions and activities.

In the enterprise of building and defending the homeland, the combined strength of the entire nation has a decisive effect on the rear services work. In the mission of combining economics with national defense, nationwide and in each locality "it is necessary to create a unified strategic deployment in order to master both the economy and national defense," and "the central economy and the local economy must pay attention to doing a good job of resolving the on-the-spot rear services of national defense."* Therefore, the rear-services work of the various echelons must be based on the strength of people's rear services and the development of the strength of the local rear services and people's rear services, in order to create material-technical reserves with which to support combat readiness and victorious combat, especially on the distant battlefields. At the same time, the units and localities must exploit their strengths in order to create the necessary material reserves and enable the on-the-spot rear services battlefield position to be increasingly strong under all circumstances. In other words, we must create additional favorable conditions in the mission of building the rear services battlefield position of people's war to defend the homeland, ensure solidity and integration, and connect the front line with the rear echelon in each strategic area and nationwide, even with regard to units fulfilling international missions in other countries. That strategic rear services battlefield position must be closely united with "plans to mobilize the national economy in a state of readiness to oppose war of aggression" and to "ensure victory over the enemy troops when changes occur," as set forth by the Fifth Party Congress. The rear services branch must urgently build rear services material-technical bases, continue to improve rear services and equipment, and study, train, and participate in maneuvers at each echelon and in each locality, in order to continually improve their command and professional abilities so that they can meet the requirements under all circumstances.

At present, the living conditions of the troops are still poor and deficient with regard to food, clothing, housing, medical treatment, etc. The Fifth Party Congress confirmed that the No 1 objective is "meeting the most urgent and pressing needs, and gradually stabilizing and improving the material and cultural lives of the people." The resolution of the Standing Committee of the Military Commission ofthe Party Central Committee also stressed stabilizing the troops' living conditions and regarded that as an important link in overcoming negativism, strengthening discipline, and improving the combined quality of our army. That manifests the concern of the Party and state for the army. The leadership and command echelons in general and the rear services branch in particular must manifest a strong sense of responsibility.

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* Fifth Party Congress Documents, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1982, Vol. 1 p. 68.

If that is to be accomplished, in addition to creating sources of material by many means, especially increasing production and practicing economy, it is necessary to pay all-out attention to the state's receiving of supplies, to distributing fairly, rationally, and to the right parties, and to ensuring product quality. It is necessary to improve the distribution mode and coordinate with the central echelon, the state, and the localities in the struggle against negativism in all spheres, especially distribution and circulation. Steps must be taken to exercise tight control in order to carry out Uncle Ho's teaching: "Enable every bowl of rice, every dong, every bullet, every medicine pill, and every inch of cloth to reach the soldiers."*

While being concerned with supporting the entire army, we must firmly grasp the key concerns: the forces at the front, on islands, and aboard ships, the units fulfilling international missions, and such people in the armed forces branches and technical combat arms as pilots, people working in unhealthy areas, etc. In 1983 all echelons, from the General Department to the military regions, corps, armed forces branches, and combat arms must take specific steps, and be determined not to allow the troops to have to eat "national soup" and "imported dipping sauce."

3. Increase production and create a new transformation in management and economizing.

While difficulties are still being encountered, organizing the entire army to produce to become partly army to produce to become partly self-sufficient, improve the troops' diet, and contribute to resolving the nation's difficulties are permanent, urgent missions. It is also very necessary to organize some of the military forces to do appropriate work. In increasing production by the troops it is necessary to grasp the central concerns: grain and perishable foods. Depending on the specific situation of each place, unit, and locality, appropriate scales must be determined. All-out attention must be paid to increasing production around kitchens and gardens, combined with concentrated production in places and units with conditions for large-scale production, to bring about real economic effectiveness. Attention must be paid to setting up stations and farms to supply seedstock and breeding stock to the units and localities, and to positively organizing the processing of non-grain foods for use in the troops' daily diets.

In production, it is necessary to stress awareness of self-reliance so that the units can meet part of their needs for capital, seedstock, fertilizer, and technical facilities. The General Department must make all-out efforts to aid the units. The lower echelon must not sit and wait on the upperechelon, and the upper echelon should not give a blank check to the units. If production is to develop, it is necessary to have plans for using products and closely managing that use. First of all, there must be continuous improvement of the troops' diet, there must be appropriate policies and regulations with regard to good producers, and it is necessary to go all-out in opposing waste, corruption, and the unprincipled use of the results of production.

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* Instruction of Chairman Ho at the First All-Army Supply Conference, 22 June 1952.

In [illegible], although initial results were attained in economizing, a strong, [illegible] transformation was not brought about and there were no practical results. The resolution of the Fifth Party Congress regarded economizing as a "national policy," and the Council of Ministers has also issued decisions and directives regarding economizing, paying for and balancing materials, the recovery of waste materials and scrap metals, the protection and management of POL and electrical goods, etc. Therefore, each echelon and sector must draft very specific plans, quotas, and norms in order to achieve tight management and maximum economy. At all leadership and command levels there must be a specialized division of labor in order to monitor and closely guide that matter. There must be a policy of rewarding, or strictly and punishing, units and individuals with accomplishments in management and economizing, especially with regard to the various kinds of scarce, valuable materials, including grain, POL, cloth, military equipment, medicines, etc.

4. Urgently and effectively combine the economy with national defense.

Closely combining the economy with the economy is one of the basic factors which creates the combined strength of the great enterprise of defending the socialist homeland. That is a major concern of the entire Party, the entire army, and the entire population, but it is also a very urgent and practical content of rear services in preparation for war. Only on the basis of combining the economy with national defense and national defense with the economy can we build and consolidate a strong national defense throughout the nation, in each strategic area and locality, form rear services deployment for each province, build strong on-the-spot rear services material-technical bases, build a rear services battlefield position, and prepare for people's war to defend the homeland.

The rear services of the military regions play an extremely important role, for the military region is the campaign-strategic echelon and has a very heavy responsibility. The military regions must have plans for coordinating with the provincial and municipal administrations in their areas, and must guide the provincial and district military commands in carrying out the rear services work. The military regions and main-force units must have plans for cooperating closely with the localities and military regions. The economy must be combined with national defense not only to meet the permanent rear services and technical needs of national defense in peacetime but also to increase state reserves and prepare to mobilize the national economy in wartime.

Recently the resolution of the Third Plenum of the VCP Central Committee and the resolution of the Military Commission stressed the army's mission of participating in production labor and economic construction by using army forces in appropiate economic construction tasks, mobilizing national defense industry to participate in planned economic activities, and organizing the units in the military region to produce in order to meet part of their needs. The echelons must fully understand and correctly apply that orientation in their sphere of authority.

5. Endeavor to improve the quality of the rear services work and resolutely oppose negativism in the rear services branch.

At present, the rear services work of supporting the troops' lives and activities is becoming increasingly complex. The negative situation in society can affect production, supplying, storage, transportation, etc. Therefore, the managing rear services echelons must pay attention to political education, strengthen the ideological work, and enable the rear services cadres and personnel to fully understand the resolutions of the Party and clearly understand the situation of the nation and the complicated, fierce nature of the class struggle under the new circumstances. They must also be conscious of revolutionary vigilance toward sabotage by the enemy and manifest a sense of responsibility toward all-out service to the troops. Along with the ideological work it is necessary to improve management, bolster work ability, do a good job of implementing policies,and enable the men to contentedly and enthusiastically work in the branch for a long time. Much attention must be paid to building good, strong rear-services organs and bases so that they can be sufficiently strong to serve the battlefield and the units, support combat readiness and combat, prepare rear services for war in all respects, and improve the quality and effectiveness of the rear services work of all echelons.

In the sphere of production and the contracting out and purchasing of goods it is necessary to increase productivity, while also paying special attention to ensuring specifications, quality, and time, in accordance with the current principles and regulations regarding state economic contracts. There must be resolute struggle against all instances of collusion and the theft of raw materials and materials, which harms socialist property.

In the sphere of distribution it is necessary to ensure fairness, rationality, and adherence to standards and quantities. It is necessary to improve the supplying mode and distribute on a selective basis, to ensure that supplies reach the cadres and enlisted men in accordance with standards and as rapidly as possible.

In the sphere of transportation it is necessary to have two-way transportation, increase transportation productivity, pay attention to cargo handling and storage, and ensure quantity and quality. We must oppose the theft and damaging of goods, especially modern facilities and technical equipment.

In the enterprise of defending and building the socialist homeland, improving the over-all quality of the people's armed forces is a very urgent requirement. In 1983 we must organize the good implementation of the rear services work and stabilize the living conditions of the cadres and men despite difficult economic conditions, in order to contribute effectively to improving the troops' quality and fighting strength and creating an important transformation in our army's discipline.

With a tradition of solidarity and unanimity, a tradition of overcoming difficulties to serve the troops, consciousness of self-reliance, and a dedicated, resourceful spirit on the part of the rear services system, especially the rear services cadres at the various echelons, I am confident that our rear services branch will advance with a strong will and determination, endeavor to overcome all difficulties, and fulfill all missions, assigned by the Party, the state, and the army.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

LOCAL PEOPLE'S WAR CAMPAIGNS DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 83 pp 37-50

[Article by Q.S.: "Local People's War Campaigns"]

[Text] One of the most outstanding, unique features of the mode of waging people's war and armed struggle in our country is the formation and development of local people's war, which we previously called guerrilla war.

Guerrilla war -- local people's war -- appeared and was widely applied by our troops and people in close coordination with regular war, war waged by main-force units in the recent liberation and national preservation wars. That was a rather concentrated reflection of the creativity of the Vietnamese people in the military sphere -- in uprisings and warfare, just as Engels taught: "A people who want to win independence cannot be limited to ordinary modes of waging war."

Military theory and art in our country have dealt with guerrilla war and local people's war in the strategic and technical spheres. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the sphere of campaign art. The questions that are posed are whether there is a phenomenon called a guerrilla campaign or a local people's war campaign, and if there is, what is the campaign art of local people's war?

These are not simply theoretical questions in the theory of military art and campaign art of Vietnamese people's war. They are important, real problems which have a very great guidance significance at present with regard to the building of national defense by all the people in the localities, the building of district military fortresses, the development of provinces into strategic units, the perfection of local military organs and the local armed forces, and preparations for promoting and further developing local people's wars into a war to defend the homeland.

We all know that people's war in our country, under the leadership of the Party, is all-round war by all the people, brings into play the combined strength of people's war, and has as its hard-core forces the people's armed forces, including the main-force troops, the local troops, the militia, and the self-defense forces. Our people's war is the combination of two war-waging modes: regular war (war waged by main-force units) and guerrilla war (war waged by the local people). Therefore, the common form of the people's

war campaign combines both war-waging modes, with the operational activities of the main-force units playing the decisive role in annihilating large parts of the enemy troops and transforming the situation on the battlefield. That is a basic characteristic of Vietnamese people's war campaigns.* Therefore, in campaigns the two war-waging modes cannot be separated and the operational activities of the three types of troops cannot be separated. When studying and resolving the theoretical and practical problems of campaign art in our country, it is incorrect to only see the role of main-force troops or to stress in a one-sided manner the role of the local armed forces.

The campaigns of people's war may be manifested in many forms, depending on the objectives, forces, type of operational activity, etc., in those campaigns, such as offensive campaigns, defensive campaigns, etc. Most of those campaigns stress the use of main-force units and are people's war campaigns waged by main-force units in combination with the local armed forces. The main-force troops can carry out many types of campaigns, including independent campaigns carried out by the armed forces branches.

Furthermore, because our strategic and campaign objectives and the specific situation on each battlefield differ, we do not everywhere and at all times have all three kinds of troops. In some areas we have no or very few main-force troops. In other areas, at certain times we have no main-force troops, but only the local armed forces and the local people. The local armed forces (including local troops organized to a certain degree and broad militia and self-defense forces), in addition to operating continuously, at certain times can, according to the requirements of the strategic mission, carry out activity campaigns and even campaigns. Those are guerrilla campaigns, local people's war campaigns.

Thus in addition to such categories as offensive campaigns, defensive campaigns, air-defense campaigns, etc., which combine both war-waging modes and the three kinds of troops, we can categorize people's war campaigns as campaigns waged by main-force units (in combination with local people's war) and campaigns of local people's war. The problem that is posed is to analyze the component factors of local people's war campaigns and clarify the characteristics of local people's war campaigns in comparison to the campaigns of war waged by main-force units, in order to find their distinctive laws and, on that basis, gradually develop the campaign theory and art of local people's war and take the initiative in organizing and carrying out that type of campaign with self-enlightenment in people's war to defend the homeland.

The history of guerrilla war and local people's war in people's war in our country has passed through a process of development from a low level to a high level during the past several decades.

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* "Campaigns and Some Characteristics of Vietnamese People's War Campaigns" by "Q.S.", TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 6, 1982.

In the August Revolution there took place limited guerrilla wars by the guerrilla units and uprising units, which developed step-by-step in the process of our people carrying out partial uprisings and then advancing to a general uprising to win political power on a national scale.

In the anti-French resistance war, in accordance with the Party's people's war line and in a broad movement for all the people to fight the enemy, our soldiers and people gradually stepped up "guerrilla warfare" and then developed from guerrilla warfare to regular war and combined regular war with guerrilla war to defeat the war of aggression of the French colonialists.

In revolution and revolutionary war in the south, guerrilla warfare also gradually emerged from the partial uprisings and "simultaneous uprisings" in a number of localities in the late 1950's, then developed strongly, was combined with regular warfare, and defeated one after the other many neocolonial war strategies of the U.S. imperialists.

In the socialist north, the great rear area of the anti-U.S. resistance war throughout the nation, in people's war against the war of destruction there took place, along with the selected air-defense activities of the main-force air-defense, air force, and naval units, the widespread air-defense activities of the local troops, militia, and self-defense forces, in close combination with the activities supporting communications and transportation, air defense, and evacuation, and the repair of damage inflicted by enemy attacks.

In the two wars to defend the homeland, on the southwestern and northern borders, there took place and developed to a certain level the operational activities of the local troops, the militia, and the self-defense forces, which contributed, along with the main-force units, to defeating the war of aggression of the Chinese reactionaries.

In general, in the two resistance wars against France and the U.S. guerrilla warfare and local people's war appeared and developed before regular warfare by main-force units. In those wars, guerrilla warfare-local people's war campaigns did not appear at the very beginning but only appeared and developed after a certain time, with specific forms and contents that were tied in with the conditions and circumstances of the fighting between ourselves and the enemy.

In the first developmental phases, guerrilla war and local people's war take form and to a degree still have a spontaneous mass nature, still have limited objectives, and are dispersed among villages, neighborhoods, districts, and provinces in the form of small, scattered battles with very primitive weapons. At first the mass armed forces are still very weak, their numbers are small, and their equipment is lacking, and the local provincial and district troops have not yet been organized or have been organized only on a small scale. The party organization, the governmental organization,and the local military organs during that period still have little experience in guiding the guerrilla warfare movement and the movement for the entire nation to fight the enemy and serve the fighting in the locality. Communications-liaison facilities to ensure timely combat command in the different circumstances are also very limited. Therefore, it is not yet possible to speak of capability of

coordinating the guerrilla (or guerrilla style) battles in an area, or coordinating those in one area with those in another area.

Once the party committee echelons, governmental administrations, and local military organs have been developed and consolidated, experience has been accumulated, the local troops have developed to the company scale in the districts and the battalion and regiment scales in the provinces and municipalities, guerrilla squads and platoons have been created broadly in hamlets and villages, specialized commando units have become the principal operating forces in the municipalities and cities, and concentrated main-force units on a relatively large scale in the military regions, guerrilla warfare and local people's war undergo outstanding development. At the same time, major, urgent missions were posed for resistance war in general and with regard to the local localities specifically, such as smashing the enemy's large sweeping operations,defending the free areas and the liberated area, attacking the enemy's rear areas, bases, rear services-technical bases, and system of strategic roads, creating new base areas and battlefields, liberating the people and the land, winning the right of mastership, destroying the puppet village administrations, eliminating traitors, setting up a revolutionary administration in a large area, coordinating with the campaigns of the main-force troops in the principal area, coordinating with the masses carrying out political struggles in the municipalities, cities, and important rural areas against the enemy's reactionary policies or to support the people's partial uprisings, etc. Clearly, from the point of view of the localities, guerrilla war and local people's war cannot fulfill those missions cannot if there are only scattered guerrilla attacks by individual villages by excessively small forces. Thus the new forms and operational methods of guerrilla war and local people's war appeared and took form as if they were objective requirments which were posed by the new missions and new capabilities which appeared during the resistance war.

On the battlefield, in addition to the continuous, widespread, and relentless operational activities of the militia, guerrillas, and local troops under differing conditions with regard to time, weather, and terrain, the form of coordinating the attacks of the local armed forces against a principal objective, according to unified guidance and operational plans in a certain area and at a certain time, gradually took form and increasingly developed. That form of operational activity is normally organized and carried out under the direct guidance and command of the local party committees and military organs, according to the strategic plans and policies of each developmental period of the war. The offensive objective might be enemy troops stationed in or passing through the locality, systems of bases and outposts, road systems, local puppet governmental administrations, etc. The hard-core forces for carrying out those attacks are the local provincial and district battalions and regiments, or sometimes a few main-force infantry regiments of the military region stationed in the province or main-force units of the Ministry, in close cooperation with the militia-guerrilla forces and the other combat and struggle organizations of the people. The "guerrilla" attacks sometimes include "regular" attacks which are closely coordinated (in a relative sense)with regard to objectives, locations, and time and take place continuously or by stages -- sometimes concentrated and sometimes scattered -- by many forces and

hostilities on a small or medium scale, including attacks by guerrilla teams and units and important attacks by provincial and district local troops to take key objectives. That operational form can take place in a certain period of time in a district, in many districts, or in a province, or in a municipality or city, and depends on the nature and missions of the attacking forces. They can be independent armed activities and can be combined with political struggle and partial uprising of the masses in areas temporarily controlled by the people. They are guerrilla warfare operations in which there gradually appeared factors which formed a new operational form which may be called guerrilla war campaigns or local people's war campaigns.

The history of the military art of people's war led by our Party has recorded many extremely rich examples of that type of campaign. Between the end of December 1951 and January 1953 two main-force regiments and the armed forces of Thai Binh Province, consisting of the provincial and district infantry battalions, launched a series of armed attacks, combined with many rich forms of mass struggle, in an area comprising six districts in which they smashed more than three-fourths of the enemy's system of outposts, liberated 74 villages and 600,000 people, and expanded the free area to 2,000 square meters. (Some people are of the opinion that that was a type of campaign which combined the three kinds of troops in people's war during the anti-French resistance war in a highly populated lowland area, not simply a local people's war campaign). During the last months of 1953 and the first part of 1954, in coordination with the Dien Bien Phu campaign our soldiers and people launched many offensives, including "guerrilla" attacks on the enemy's rear area and later in the Red River delta, exemplary of which were the attacks on the Gia Lam and Cat Bi airfields in which 78 enemy airplanes were destroyed. It may be said that that was a form of offensive campaign of local people's war.

Local people's war campaigns were carried out at a higher level during the anti-U.S. resistance war. Offensive campaigns by the various forces -- guerrillas, local provincial and district troops, commandos, and snipers--carried out in accordance with a unified plan to attack the enemy's bases and rear areas in the lowland rural areas and in municipalities and cities, or to attack the enemy's strategic road system in the south developed very strongly and attained very high strategic effectiveness. Especially, offensive campaigns of local people's war, closely combined with the political struggles and uprisings of the masses, to destroy the basic-level U.S.-puppet administrations, establish the people's right to mastership, upset the "pacification, population concentration" plan, and destroy segments of the enemy's outpost systems, developed very strongly in the Mekong Delta, the lowlands of Interzone 5, Tri Thien-Hue, etc.

It may be concluded that in the recent liberation wars and national defense wars in our country the phenomenon called guerrilla campaigns or local people's war campaigns appeared and gradually developed with specific, very rich forms.

According to the general law of combining battles in accordance with a unified plan and toward a definite objective, guerrilla war-local people's war campaigns must also coordinate the attacks of the local armed forces (in

liberation war it is usually possible to combine them with the political forces and the mass political movement to win the right of mastership, in accordance with unified guidance and action plans, in order to attain the strategic objective in the locality. At the same time, guerrilla war-based people's war campaigns have characteristics which differ from those of war waged by main-force units with regard to operational methods, guidance, and command, so they must develop in accordance with their distinctive laws.

In local people's war campaigns in liberation wars there are no conditions for annihilating large enemy main-force units or the widespread depletion of these forces, but have the mission and capability of annihilating important parts of the local forces, regional forces, and popular forces, and of wiping out small outposts and the puppet administrative apparatus, in combination with political struggle and uprisings by the masses to eliminate every village administrations, eliminate traitors, win the right of self-mastery, expand the guerrilla bases and zones, and expand the liberated area, either independently or in coordination with the campaigns of the main-force troops in the principal areas. The main forcesof local people's war campaigns are the local armed forces (local provincial and district troops organized on a certain scale, militia, and self-defense forces), with the possible participation of main-force units of the military regions or the Ministry, in combination with the mass political forces organized into a "political army" at a certain level or in a certain form. The operational method of local people's war in liberation war is usually to combine armed struggle with political struggle and military attacks with mass uprisings, and to combine the annihilation and attrition of the enemy with winning and keeping the people's mastership rights. With regard to armed struggle, based on a battlefield position that is interwoven with that of the enemy and the on-the-spot forces, small and active battles fought by the local armed forces in the "guerrilla" manner by means of many different combat facilities may bring into play the capability of the loyal people -- both the local armed forces and the popular masses -- to fight the enemy. There must also be "pivotal" battles with a key nature to ensure the campaign to develop as planned and defeat the enemy's counter-measures. Guidance and command in local people's war campaigns are not identical to those in campaigns carried out by main-force units. It is possible to determine missions and draft plans in advance for each component and area so that they can take the initiative in fighting battles and dealing in a flexible, initiative manner with developments in the campaign. However, the units and areas cannot be given "blank checks" and allowed to act arbitrarily, as they see fit.

On the basis of the preliminary analysis presented above we can see that the standards of campaigns fought by main-force units, and especially the campaigns of modern countries, cannot be used to judge the local people's war campaigns. In our country, even the campaigns fought by main-force units and modern campaigns have developed from "guerrilla campaigns." Thus, as stated above, the campaigns of Vietnamese people's war must combine both warfare by main-force units and local people's war. They have characteristics that differ from those of the traditional, ordinary wars in many other countries. Local people's war is also an exception to the traditional, ordinary war and modern wars in general, and reflects its distinctive laws. For example, modern campaigns require the creation of a light formation with a first echelon, a

[illegible] artillery, [illegible] at the [illegible] [illegible] a campaign rear area, etc. [illegible] of the campaign of local people's war is based on local mastery, local relative, [illegible] with the enemy's positions, in order to create [illegible] [illegible] The campaigns carried out by the [illegible] [illegible] mobile forces to maintain the initiative, but the local campaigns take advantage of the superiority of [illegible] to achieve force mobility and seizing the initiative in the [illegible] campaign. The campaigns of local people's war take advantage [illegible] of [illegible] movement and fighting at close quarters and [illegible] [illegible], mechanized riflemen, and [illegible] forces, to [illegible] firepower system, while modern campaigns require the [illegible] of artillery firepower and a truly strong air force, air [illegible] firepower.

[illegible] campaigns carried out by militiamen units, local people's [illegible] a concentrated mobilization of the manpower for all [illegible] the army, with the local armed forces serving as the hard [illegible] operational core with effectiveness in fighting the enemy [illegible] forces, the local troops, the militia, and the self-defense [illegible] in combination with the broad movement of the popular masses [illegible] armed struggle arises and developed under the condition [illegible] the land, in their country, in a national strategic [illegible] type of troops, a state of local mastery, mastery of [illegible] and active offensive of our soldiers and people in the spirit [illegible] offensive and disposing the enemy troops, and an interweaving [illegible] between guerilla and the army. It was also an inevitable [illegible] war and local people's war, from relative spontaneity [illegible] and temporary slower transformation, and from disper[illegible] in combination, relative concentration, relative [illegible] of campaigns. In order to already develop in [illegible] war, along with war fought by militiamen units, [illegible] to our advantage, and all victory in [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] way it shows local people's war campaign [illegible] experience accumulated during [illegible] war, it is possible to [illegible] [illegible] organizing and carrying out local people's war [illegible] the rear land.

[illegible] necessary to carefully study the [illegible] [illegible] army with large-scale concentration, relatively [illegible] [illegible] very large — nuclear. When launching a war of aggression to attack our country the [illegible] [illegible] and war facilities [illegible] carry out [illegible] [illegible] in the air, and at sea, especially on land, [illegible] and attack continuously and [illegible] The [illegible] [illegible] of rapidly annihilating our armed forces, [illegible] [illegible] ordinary people, [illegible] and [illegible] our property in the [illegible] of their ruling rule in our country. It is also possible

[illegible]

[illegible] small clusters" are brought into play, and the more will [illegible] the enemy [illegible] scattered and divided, and the more enemy forces are tied down [illegible]

[illegible] the utilization of fighting methods in local people's war campaigns [illegible] in many ways from that of warfare by main-force units.

[illegible] participating forces in people's war campaigns are the local units and border defense troops in the districts, provinces, and municipalities, [illegible] the forces are the militia and self-defense forces of the villages, [illegible] neighborhoods, factories, and state farms. The forces participating in [illegible] have very different organizational [illegible] and weapons, from primitive [illegible] to relatively modern and modern weapons, and the fighting methods of [illegible] troops, border defense troops, militia, self-defense forces, [illegible], are not identical. Therefore, it is necessary to bring into play the capabilities and strengths of each force and create the greatest effectiveness of each force and the campaign as a whole. The campaign cannot be [illegible] "model." The very fighting methods of local people's war are [illegible] all fighting methods of the concentrated armed forces (the local, provincial and district troops), the mass armed forces, and the armed masses, which are creative, rich, and flexible, and cannot be restricted to a narrow framework, which would cause them to lose their vital force.

[illegible] people's war campaigns must know how to closely combine the method of fighting the enemy by means of concentrated forces and the method of fighting [illegible] by means of dispersed forces. Without battles fought by the concentrated forces of local district, provincial, and municipal troops, we [illegible] annihilate large numbers of enemy troops or fulfill the campaign's [illegible]; there would be no campaign. Furthermore, if there [illegible] continuous and lasting small, widespread battles all over the campaign [illegible] of militia and self-defense forces armed with all kinds of [illegible] primitive, [illegible] weapons, mines, spike [illegible] with very different [illegible] strength [illegible] and disperse enemy forces, [illegible] by concentrated forces and the campaign [illegible] be maintained. The experience of the anti-French and [illegible] war [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

with those of the mobile forces in a campaign. Everyone must admit that one of the superiorities of the operational art of local people's war is the active, timely, continuous, and extensive method of fighting the enemy of the on-the-spot forces, including the local concentrated armed forces and the broad mass forces. Large militia and self-defense forces are organized in the villages, factories, state farms, and integrated combat clusters -- and in the organizational framework of district military bastions -- which can fight the enemy according to plan or not according to plan, fight the enemy no matter what the circumstances, and fight the enemy regardless of the time or weather. These fighting methods are very effective in wearing down large numbers and wiping out small units, as well as in dispersing and dividing the enemy troops and causing them to change from many to few and from strong to weak. But if we are limited to the fighting method of sing only on-the-spot forces -- the broad militia and self-defense forces -- we cannot strike blows to annihilate important segments of the enemy, coordinate the battles, and guide the development of the battles in order to form campaigns. Therefore, such fighting methods must be closely combined with the fighting methods of the mobile forces and the mobile units of the district, provincial, and municipal local troops, and sometimes even the main-force units of the military regions and the Ministry are deployed as on-the-spot forces in the localities. The fighting method of the mobile forces are usually intended to fulfill important missions in an area of the campaign, with the use of concentrated forces on an appropriate scale, and to fight enemy-annihilating battles in the campaign. At times the activities of such forces can also support the on-the-spot forces, create an integrated position in order to fight the enemy, or coordinate the battles in a certain area. In this case, the separation of on-the-spot forces from mobile forces and the fighting methods of those forces are only relative and can change or transform one another. In organizing combat in a district, the on-the-spot forces are the militia and combat self-defense forces in the villages and the mobile forces are the local district troops. In a province, the combat forces in each district are the on-the-spot forces and the mobile forces are the province's combined units. In that case, the combat villages and the integrated combat clusters can also organize mobile and on-the-spot forces.

In local people's war campaigns it is necessary to closely combine the offensive with the defensive and the defensive with the offensive, with principal emphasis on offensive combat. The strong point of the mass armed forces and the local troops in attacking the enemy is taking the offensive. Local people's war campaigns in wars to defend the homeland must strongly develop many forms of offensive combat by the local troops and the militia and self-defense forces and apply and improve on the lessons that were learned in the anti-French and anti-U.S. wars. The forces participating in the campaigns -- the local troops, border defense troops, militia, and self-defense troops -- must be skilled with regard to both offensive combat and defensive combat, and know how to closely combine offensive combat with defensive combat. A system of combat villages, combat neighborhoods, integrated combat clusters, and defensive positions in the important areas is organized in advance to create conditions so that such forces can engage in both defensive and offensive combat. Only good defensive fighting combined closely with offensive combat can protect the people, defend the land, and defend base areas and staging areas from which to attack the enemy, stop and pin down the enemy, and reduce the intensity and speed of their offensive. The important question is

how we should defend. President Ho set forth the viewpoint "taking the defensive in an offensive status" by the guerrillas, "that is, attacking the enemy in order to take the defensive, not sitting in one place so that the enemy can attack us at will." In addition to the defensive battles, the offensive battles will take place on a wide scale to annihilate large numbers of the enemy, divide their forces, and attack the key objectives in their formation and in their rear area. Offensive battles organized and carried out rapidly, secretly, and unexpectedly by means of all forces and facilities and on all scales will force the enemy into a passive, confused position and gradually weaken them and wear them down. Those campaigns include decisive offensive battles to transform the situation and result in the development of the campaign to our advantage.

The operations of the local armed forces in the campaign must also be combined closely with the other forms of struggle of the people. According to the specific situation, it is possible to use and develop to a higher level the rich experiences in air defense, evacuation, and reparing damage inflicted by the enemy during the war of destruction, as well as some combat experiences of the masses in the liberation war.

The present enterprise in building and defending the homeland in each locality and nationwide, in accordance with the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress, is creating new, very great political, economic, cultural, and scientific-technical capabilities in order to continually consolidate and strengthen national defense by all the people, and is creating conditions for promoting people's war in war to defend the homeland by means of war waged by main-force units combined closely with local people's war. The many difficulties which are still being encountered in the nation's economic situation and living conditions, and which are affecting national defense, are certain to be gradually overcome.

In the process of building district military bastions and developing the provinces and municipalities into strategic national defense units, in addition to concentrating on the good resolution of the urgent economic and living conditions problems of the localities and defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction, it is necessary to pay attention to making preparations in all regards so that when large-scale war breaks out local people's war can be developed to a new level and local people's war campaigns can be carried out at a higher level than during the anti-French and anti-U.S. resistance wars. Only thereby can the strategic missions of war to defend the homeland which are assigned to the localities in the struggle against the new enemy aggressors be fulfilled victoriously.

It is necessary to actively prepare battlefield postions, forces, operational plans, and campaign plans; popular forces, local armed forces, and material-technical bases; local troops, militia and self-defense forces, and local military organs; and command organization, combat coordination, and material-technical support. It is necessary to pay special attention to deploying and training a corps of local military cadres with all-round ability. They must not only fully understand the locality and its political, cultural, and social problems, but also be expert in building and guiding the movement for all the people to participate in national defense and fight the enemy in the locality.

It is also necessary to command the components of the local armed forces, coordinate with the main-force units, and prepare, organize, and carry out local people's local campaigns under many complicated circumstances of war to defend the homeland.

5616
CSO: 4209/412

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

VICE-CHAIRMAN VU DINH LIEU DISCUSSES FOOD PROBLEMS

Hanoi VIETNAM PICTORIAL in English No 289,Jan 83 p 1

[Article by Do Phuong]

[Excerpt] *I asked Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vu Dinh Lieu as he returned from a visit to an upland province of north Vietnam:*

«Are we to attain the food targets of this first year of implementation of the Resolution of the Fifth Party Congress?»

«We hit the jackpot!» he answered with a broad smile. «In Bac Thai (in the northern uplands — Ed.) they told me this is going to be the most plentiful harvest for a decade. And in Hau Giang down south, unprecedentedly high yields are expected from hundreds of thousands of hectares. The overall situation is one we can be happy about.»

«Can we say that the 16 million ton target is certain to be fulfilled this year for our paddy production?» I insisted. «Western media have been saying that speaking about agriculture in his National Day speech, To Huu was only cautiously optimistic and not specific. What do you make of it?»

Vu Dinh Lieu did not answer right away. His cheerful easygoingness vanished. It was as though he felt this was not to be an informal small talk.

«Is it to be a formal interview?» he asked after a while. But then he went on, again looking perfectly at ease: «The problem is not merely to get 16 million tons of paddy. Even if we are to achieve this, we won't be providing our people with more than 300 kilos of food grain per capita. The real question is how to draw useful experience from agricultural realities in the years 1981—82 in order to progress further on the road charted by the Fifth Party Congress.

«Since you mentioned To Huu's National Day speech, I'd like to quote him: «The relatively all-round successes recorded in agricultural production testify to the effectiveness of the new policies and the progress in the application of science and technology and in managerial work, particularly in the localities and at grassroots level. While we have at our disposal less materials and equipment than before and while the population has increased by six million since the liberation of the south, and remembering that over the past years we have had to import large amounts of food, let us point out that this year for the first time we are able to solve an important part of our food problem.»

«No Vietnamese would have thought that those were cautiously optimistic and unspecific words.»

«Yes, surely. In 1975 the per capita paddy share was 240 kilos. Now, in spite of a population increase of six million, this share has increased, although it is not quite 300 kilos per head as yet. Formerly we imported about two million tons of food each year. Now we're closer to self-sufficiency.»

«Let's go back to those remarks from the West,» Vu Dinh Lieu said. «Those people either fail, or do not wish, to understand us. Isn't caution a necessity when everything is only beginning, when we don't have as yet an adequate material and technical infrastructure, an industry on which agriculture can rely? When we have not yet eliminated the terrible sequels of war and are facing new threats of war? When we still have to perfect new managerial mechanisms and do not yet possess the necessary material means to confront natural calamities? And all this while the rate of our population growth has not yet been reduced to less than 2%»?

Why shouldn't we be cautious in our appraisal of agricultural production, concerned as we are about conditions in central provinces, especially Nghe Tinh and partly about Thanh Hoa, which were hit by Typhoon «Nancy» with huge waves rarely seen before in the Nghe Tinh coast?»

«All right. When you set the target of nine million tons of paddy for the Mekong delta by the year 1985, I suppose you've done this on the basis of serious calculations?»

Vu Dinh Lieu looked at me and burst out laughing. «Don't be overly concerned about the figures,» he said, «although figures are [illegible] we must be careful about. With regard to the Mekong delta, it's not only a question of nine million tons of food grain but also of a million tons of other foodstuffs and several hundred million dollars' worth of exportable goods by 1985. Think of the significance and content of these figures. Of the policies, relations of production and forms of organization required. Of the people involved. Careful scrutiny has been made of the realities of life, of the potentials of the country, of the possibilities of mobilization. And yet much remains to be done. Everything will depend on the efforts made and dynamism shown, from the central to the grassroots levels — by each co-operative, each production collective, each peasant household.»

CSO: 4200/714

NEW BANK ACCOUNTS OPENED IN HANOI

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Le Ba Thao: "Hanoi Open Private Bank Accounts for Businesses in Industry and Commerce"]

[Text] Together with the implementation of the law revising a number of points in the industrial-commercial tax code, the opening of private accounts and the depositing of money in the bank by large and medium size businesses in commerce have been underway in the capital Hanoi since 10 May 1983. In the establishment of the new, socialist economic order on the distribution-circulation front, especially within the private economy, the tools of taxes, prices and money play a very important role. In essence, this is a sharp and complicated class struggle, one which requires that we launch a strong mass movement in coordination with taking well coordinated administrative and economic measures under the direct guidance of the various party committee echelons. The opening of private accounts by businesses is not only designed to bring a certain amount of cash into the bank when accounts are opened, but primarily to bring the financial activities of private businessmen within the orb of state inspection and control in the interest of developing and managing the economy in accordance with the guidelines of the party and state and, at the same time, initiate payment through the bank in order to reduce the volume of cash in circulation.

In the space of 6 days, from 10 to 15 May, 365 work teams consisting of nearly 1,500 cadres from the banking sector, the commerce sector, the finance sector, the war and subward governments and the public security sector of the municipality of Hanoi were mobilized, thoroughly trained and sent to each business to take pledges stipulating the size of initial deposits, the size of subsequent periodic deposits and the maximum amount that is to remain on deposit. The initial result was that 95 percent of the businesses (large and medium size) signed the above mentioned pledges and nearly 85 percent opened accounts and made initial deposits in them totally nearly 6 million dong. Since 15 May, the majority of these businesses have deposited their receipts in the bank every 3 or 5 days. The commercial offices of the bank and the savings funds within the city arranged for the quick collection of the money used to open accounts and are preparing the papers and procedures needed for

the use of these accounts by businesses, beginning with the withdrawal of money to pay the taxes that are due in May.

Generally speaking, because the new accounts have been propagandized and explained well, because private businesses see the benefits derived from them and because their initial concerns and questions were answered, they have fully complied with the measures taken by the Municipal People's Committee. The opinion among them is one of welcoming this policy. The bank and the savings funds of the city have begun to improve their organization and procedures and provide convenient, rapid service. However, there are still some businesses, for the most part large businesses that have long been operating on the basis of speculation and deception, of registering for one business while actually operating a different business in an attempt to evade control by the state, that expressed an attitude of protect from the very outset by not receiving work teams, giving reasons why they could not sign pledges or, after finding that it was necessary to sign a pledge, hesitating or procrastinating when it came to opening an account. When these businesses were forced to open accounts and make their initial deposits, they looked for ways to get around the provisions of their pledges... In the face of this situation, the governments of the various wards and subwards, adopting a stern attitude toward these businesses, closely inspected and forced them to fully comply with their pledges. The resolute guidance recently provided by the municipal, ward and subward levels of government and the various functional agencies have had the sympathy and support of the people, cadres, manual workers and the armed forces.

The opening of private accounts in the bank over the past 2 weeks within Hanoi has only been the initial phase, namely, the opening of accounts and the depositing of money in the bank on the basis of business receipts and the monthly taxes due to the state. Based on the business receipts stated in tax notices, bank cadres of the work teams, together with businessmen, have determined the average business receipts minus the ceiling on the amount of capital needed to meet business expenses and the ceiling on the cost of living of the family; the businessman has the obligation to periodically deposit the balance in the bank and is paid interest under the current interest regulations of the State Bank. Businessmen have the right to use the balance on deposit in their accounts to pay monthly taxes, expand their businesses, or make other payments when necessary. The work method and the methods of computation employed by the work teams described above have resulted in ready acceptance of this policy by businesses and shown them that if they truly operate in a legitimate fashion, their right to own property and their right to have a business license will continue to be guaranteed and their normal business activities will not be impeded provided that they fulfill their tax obligations in a fair and forthcoming manner.

Through the practical jobs mentioned above, the work teams resolved the initial worries and concerns of business men, such as their fear that work teams would search their houses for cash, their concern that they would not have enough money to open accounts and pay taxes, their concern that depositing money in the bank would take time away from their work and that it would not be easy to withdraw the money when needed and so forth.

In the months ahead, this work will continue to be carried out in accordance with directive number 18/CT dated 24 May 1983 from the Municipal People's Committee. Businesses that have opened accounts are receiving notices from the people's committees of the wards and districts concerning the amount of money to be periodically deposited in the bank (as established in their pledge) and the specific schedule for making monthly deposits. The Municipal People's Committee has assigned the director of the municipal bank and the chairmen of the ward and district people's committees the responsibility of insuring close compliance with and taking legal action in keeping with the spirit of Council of Ministers' decree number 46/CP dated 10 May 1983 in each specific case involving violations. To use their accounts for the purposes stipulated by the Municipal People's Committee, businesses should directly contact the nearest savings fund (notices have been sent from the ward banks to the various subwards), where they will receive quick and convenient service.

7809
CSO: 4209/446

CAN THO SEEN AS MODEL OF MARKET MANAGEMENT

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Tuan Bay: "The Can Tho Commerce Sector Becomes the Master of the Market in Fresh Food Products"]

[Text] Since early 1981, the Commerce Agency of Can Tho City in Hau Giang Province has been managing and controlling the majority of the goods that are sold and controlled the retail sale of pork, fresh fish and fresh vegetables and fruit, thereby serving the daily needs of the cadres, troops and people of the city. These products are being widely sold on a normal basis within the city. Consumers are usually able to purchase pork and fish at stable prices. They are also able to easily buy vegetables each day, either at state stores or marketing cooperatives, both of which have the same prices. The prices of these three products on the Can Tho Market are lower than at other places in the provinces of the South.

The Can Tho commerce sector contributed to the overall achievements recorded by Hau Giang Province, achievements for which the Council of Ministers awarded the province its rotating banner for the 2 consecutive years 1981 and 1982.

Under the guidance of the local party committee echelons and the Hau Giang Provincial Commerce Bureau, the commerce sector of Can Tho City accelerated its business activities on the basis of the new mechanism and continued to strengthen and manage commerce so that socialist commerce has truly become the main force on the market.

Through its business activities, the sector has determined that Can Tho, the second largest city in the South, is not only the major market in the Mekong River Delta, but is also the market that serves as the point of origin in the flow of food products from the western provinces to Ho Chi Minh City. Large quantities of goods are shipped from other places and significant sources of products lie among the farmers in the outskirts of the city and the cadres and people of the inner city who produce, raise and sell their own products. The Hau Giang Commerce Bureau has given the Can Tho commerce sector the task of organizing local purchases from the two sources mentioned above and meeting the needs of the city so that the various districts of the province need not support the city and are free to purchase products to meet the needs of their

locality and deliver products to the upper level. As a result, Can Tho can be flexible in how it controls the sources of goods through procurements: it can purchase goods where they are produced or purchase them at the first point in the flow of goods to the Ho Chi Minh City Market. Pork, fresh water fish, vegetables and fruit are the products upon which efforts have been focused first. The sector has expanded the socialist business installations in coordination with transforming and managing the market in order to centralize the sources of goods within the hands of the state. The General Commerce Corporation has been divided into a corporation specializing in vegetables and fruit and a retail food product corporation. Each corporation has a network of stores that purchase and sell products. In addition, efforts have been concentrated on strengthening the village and subward marketing cooperatives so that these installations truly serve as the competent assistants of the corporations. The sector has assigned the village and subward marketing cooperatives the task of serving as procurement agents in the purchasing of goods within the villages and subwards.

In keeping with the policy of the city, the general corporation has organized purchasing teams that coordinate with the village and subward marketing cooperatives in mobilizing the people and purchasing hogs within each village and subward of the city. The corporation and the grain and agriculture sectors have established some sources of livestock feed for the production collectives or households that sell hogs to the state. The corporation also sells some industrial consumer goods to persons who raise sows and sell pigs to households that sell hogs to the state. The village and subward marketing cooperatives have the task of managing and mobilizing the people to sell 1 ton of pork to the state; the corporation pays the subward and village marketing cooperatives a commission of 300 dong and contributes 150 dong to the village budget. With this policy, the village buuget has a regular source of revenue, consequently, the villages have been determined to prevent dealers from competing in purchases with the state and removing them from the rural market. As a result of this effort, the sources of goods controlled by the state through purchases have increase with each year.

In order to create additional sources of goods while having a practical basis upon which to struggle to control the prices of goods being purchases, the corporation has organized procurement teams (consisting of 60 cadres and personnel) to purchase fish and vegetables where they are caught and grown for sale within the city.

In conjunction with the procurement network, the sector has expanded its retail stores. There are eight state-operated stores and 57 retail sales points of village and subward marketing cooperatives that sell pork at uniform, stipulated prices. The marketing cooperatives and pork sales agents receive a 3 percent commission. The sector does not employ small merchants as sales agents for this product. The Vegetable and Fruit Corporation has 25 retail sales points and more than 100 points at which agents of village marketing cooperatives and small merchants sell vegetables and fruit. The corporation has also organized four mobile sales vehicles in order to conveniently serve customers and help to maintain the price of vegetables on the market. It has also organized 10 retail fish counters; 41 sales points of marketing cooperatives and hundreds of small merchants who serve as sales

agents sell fish throughout the city. Because the retail sales networks of state-operated commerce and collective commerce are present everywhere in the city and because the sector has intensified its inspection and control of the private merchants who serve as retail sales agents, they have not been able to raise prices as they see fit.

In its business activities, the sector has also attached importance to market management. Private families that have permission to operate a business must register their business, operate it at a permanent site within a market and sell their products at posted prices.

As a result of the success achieved in the efforts described above, the sources of fresh food products purchased within the locality and outside the province have grown with each passing year. In 1980, the sector only purchased 700 tons of pork, live weight; in 1981, it purchased 1,500 tons and, 1982, 2,200 tons per purchased. The purchasing of field grown fish increased from 2,100 tons in 1981 to 3,000 tons in 1982. The quantity of vegetables and fruit purchased rose from 7,000 tons in 1981 to 13,500 tons in 1982, 10 times as much as was purchased in 1980. With the quantities that it has been able to purchase, the sector has been able to provide a full supply of rationed products to cadres and manual workers. In addition, it also sells products to the collective kitchens of hospitals, child care centers and kindergartens at prices 40 to 50 percent lower than prices on the free market and supplies to Ho Chi Minh City hundreds of tons of pork and field grown fish and thousands of tons of vegetables and fruit.

As a result of Can Tho's experience in expanding its business activities and controlling the market in fresh food products, 40 delegations from provincial and municipal commerce sectors throughout the country have visited the province and acknowledged that the good work performed by Can Tho must be studied.

7809
CSO: 4209/446

DEVELOPMENT OF HANDICRAFTS IN HO CHI MINH CITY

Hanoi VIETNAM PICTORIAL in English No 290 Feb 83 pp 4, 6

[Text]

Knowing how to tap the sources of raw materials within the country, organize production, and turn the skills of its craftsmen to full account, Ho Chi Minh City has done a large share in the production of consumer goods and export commodities. Jobs have been provided to hundreds of thousands of people, who were unemployed under the US neo-colonialist regime.

For decades the former city of Saigon had been importing each year large quantities of consumer goods. Handicrafts with a long-standing tradition had been smothered as a result of this flood of imports. At the time of liberation in 1975 some stocks remained but they could not last for long.

There was no alternative left but to revive the dying handicrafts and develop new ones if the needs of the city population of 3,000,000 were to be met and if contributions were to be made to the national production plan.

Given the conditions prevailing in the South where the economy still comprises several components, the leaders of Ho Chi Minh City have made a flexible application of the socialist line of economic construction and encouraged all strata of the population to engage in the production of consumer and export goods.

In every district, in both the inner city and the suburbs, craftsmen's collectives, cooperatives, and individual households have been working under the sponsorship of the local authorities and the City Federation of Handicraft Producers.

In Tan Binh district, cloth weaving has been quickly revived. Acting upon the motto: «Let the State and the people pool their efforts!» the population has raised funds, repaired machines and equipment, and looked for raw materials in other provinces, with which 112 long-term contracts have so far been signed.

Plastic goods have also come into their own. Counters and stores are now brimming with bags, toys, pails, plates, etc., made of brightly coloured plastics. At the Binh Minh factory we learned that good use has been made of retrieved scrap, of which thousands of tons have been collected each year. The factory also makes such high-grade products as

fishing line, water pipe, roofing material, machine components, etc.

Besides, other products have been made: bicycle parts, kerosene stoves, schoolbags, house furniture.

The Southern Detergent Company is an example of initiative and innovation. Previously no locally-made detergents were able to stand up to foreign competition. After liberation, the former Viet Hung company came back to life and vigorously developed under its new name. Now it is turning out a broad range of products: detergent powder, toilet soap, tooth paste, shampoo, all of superior quality.

In one area of production of export goods, people go about their trade in a rather quiet but highly efficient manner: wickerwork (bamboo, rattan) and blind-making, which keep hundreds of co-operatives busy and tens of thousands of households as well. The raw materials come from Song Be province and suburban districts.

Other trades include ceramics, rush mat and jute carpet making, jewelry, manufacture of desk fans and ceiling fans, assembly of radio and television sets.

Over the seven years since liberation, the number of production units has developed from a few hundred to 24,600, turning out thousands of items in no way inferior to imported goods. Indeed 30% of all consumer goods sold in the country are made in Ho Chi Minh City. They are sold both at roadside counters and in State-run department stores. They will be available in increasing quantities for the derive from local skills and materials brought into full play by judicious policies. Nearly 200,000 unemployed left by the former regime are now earning a stable livelihood from handicrafts. Many former capitalists who used to act as compradors for foreign firms have now turned to handicrafts.

The potentials are enormous. However, the problem of materials remains a hard nut to crack. The State can supply only about 30% of the raw materials needed each year. The rest has to be procured through the producers' own efforts. The latter must work hard to economise materials while looking for new sources of supply. To this end, the Mekong delta provinces and Ho Chi Minh City have had to pool their efforts in organizing integrated enterprises, making in-depth investments, and working out long-term plans.

Producers in Ho Chi Minh City set great store by the opinions of consumers. Their envoys go to every province in the country to study the needs and tastes of the latter. Some of the goods are still of low quality, but the control authorities have been trying hard to improve them.

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

MINES INCREASE ORE EXTRACTION RATE

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Le Thanh Vinh: "Frugality Is a National Policy: the Non-Ferrous Metals Federated Enterprise Reclaims All Ore"]

[Text] In order to reclaim all the ore that lies within the overburden in mining and sorting operations, the Non-Ferrous Metals Federated Enterprise has organized small-scale mining operations.

Having begun by collecting scattered pieces of ore, the Son Duong and Tinh Tuc Tin Mines have reorganized their labor forces and set up specialized units to sort the ore at the overburden yards and the ore lying along truck routes. Even in the very first step of the mechanized sorting process, pieces of ore larger than 10 millimeters clinging to the pieces of rock are forced to the outside by strong jets of water. The Son Duong Mine has initiated a dry sorting process to separate and reclaim these pieces of ore. As a result of the measures taken to reclaim all ore, the mine has produced 50 additional tons of ore with a tin content of 70 percent.

The Tin Tuc Mine has improved and enlarged its sorting plant, added many new machines and pieces of equipment and begun using multi-layer sedimentation systems to reclaim ore. In the eastern area, once mining operations were completed, the mine put the piles of mud back through the sedimentation process, mined by hand the spots that could not be mined by machine and, as a result, produced 92 tons of pure ore.

The Dam Hong Antimony Mine has researched the use of auxiliary support pillars and other safety measures to re-mine spots that had already been mined, thereby reclaiming 100 additional tons. The Non-Ferrous Metals Federated Enterprise has also collected and roasted 20,000 tons of low grade zinc ore that had been abandoned for many years to produce zinc powder for supply to units that produce fire resistant building materials, process rubber, paint, artists' paints and so forth.

The foundry has made many innovations to improve its refining techniques, reclaim tin dust, remove impurities and increase both the output and quality of exported tin bars. The plant also refines slag for a second time. In this

way, it reclaims an additional 47 kilograms of tin from each batch, thereby bringing the percentage of tin reclaimed to 96.5 percent, a 0.3 percent increase. Cadres and workers have researched the use of a certain percentage of slack coal and the speed of rotation of the ore mixer within the furnace at a temperature of 400 degrees and developed a method which decreases the iron content from 0.3 to 0.026 percent and raises the tin content of exported tin from 80 to 86 percent. On the other hand, with this method, the slag is soft, is easily poured off and only adheres slightly to the tin, thus further reducing the loss rate. The antimony refining plant has improved the method by which forced air is used to counteract evaporation, thereby reducing the amount of metal that adheres to the slag and increasing its product reclamation rate by 15 kilograms per batch.

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POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

DONG NAI NEW ECONOMIC ZONES GROW

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jun 83 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Dong Nai Sends Laborers and Their Families to the New Economic Zones"]

[Text] Dong Nai Province has reorganized its labor management apparatus from the province to the districts, subwards and villages in the form of a mechanism for managing and receiving labor that is coordinated between local production units and the people. The labor sector and the government organization, public security, commerce, grain, finance, education and public health committees have sent cadres to participate in this work.

The Labor Bureau of the province has established labor recruiting committees in the subwards, villages and towns, which propagandize, agitate among and guide laborers and their families in registering to go build the new economic zones and the production units of the central and local levels within the province.

The initial results of pilot projects conducted in the three districts of Xuan Loc, Chau Thanh and Xuyen Moc were that the province mobilized more than 1,300 families consisting of nearly 7,000 persons, 3,000 of whom are general laborers, to go to the farms and forestry sites that are planting rubber, carrying out afforestation, planting nua and lau bamboo and so forth. In addition, the province has received from the provinces of Thanh Hoa, Binh Tri Thien and Nghe Tinh more than 650 families consisting of nearly 3,400 persons, nearly 1,500 of whom are technically skilled laborers, for assignment to the various state farms and forestry sites.

All the units receiving laborers have thoroughly prepared stable living and working conditions for the newly arrived laborers and their families. The Dong Nai Rubber Corporation has received nearly 1,600 families, who have been sent to 10 state rubber farms, supplied 4 square meters of housing per capita to them and allocated them land with which to develop the subsidiary household economy. The Federation of Food Product Enterprises of Group 600 has distributed to each household one 2-room, 28 square meter house, 1,000 square meters of residential land and a number of commonly used household utensils. After stabilizing the living conditions of newly arrived families, the Cao

Cong and Phu Ngoc State Farms organized production and cleared 300 hectares of forest land to plant sugarcane.

By sending laborers and their families to the new economic zones, Dong Nai has begun to perform two tasks of significance, the economic task and the social task, two tasks that control the distribution of the population within the area and develop the new production forces.

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